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WHOSE EYES ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? SCOTT V. 
HARRIS AND THE PERILS OF COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM 
Dan M. Kahan,∗ David A. Hoffman,∗∗ and Donald Braman∗∗∗ 
This Article accepts the unusual invitation to “see for yourself” issued by the Supreme 
Court in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).  Scott held that a police officer did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when he deliberately rammed his car into that of a 
fleeing motorist who refused to pull over for speeding and instead sought to evade the 
police in a high-speed chase.  The majority did not attempt to rebut the arguments of the 
single Justice who disagreed with its conclusion that “no reasonable juror” could find 
that the fleeing driver did not pose a deadly risk to the public.  Instead, the Court 
uploaded to its website a video of the chase, filmed from inside the pursuing police 
cruisers, and invited members of the public to make up their own minds after viewing it.  
We showed the video to a diverse sample of 1350 Americans.  Overall, a majority agreed 
with the Court’s resolution of the key issues, but within the sample there were sharp 
differences of opinion along cultural, ideological, and other lines.  We attribute these 
divisions to the psychological disposition of individuals to resolve disputed facts in a 
manner supportive of their group identities.  The Article also addresses the normative 
significance of these findings.  The result in the case, we argue, might be defensible, but 
the Court’s reasoning was not.  Its insistence that there was only one “reasonable” view 
of the facts itself reflected a form of bias — cognitive illiberalism — that consists in the 
failure to recognize the connection between perceptions of societal risk and contested 
visions of the ideal society.  When courts fail to take steps to counteract that bias, they 
needlessly invest the law with culturally partisan overtones that detract from the law’s 
legitimacy.  
INTRODUCTION 
or Craig Jones, it had to be one of those sinking moments when a 
lawyer arguing a case before the Supreme Court realizes, with 
stomach-turning certitude, that all is lost.  Not only were the Justices 
broadcasting in their questions at oral argument that they were dis-
posed to rule against him.  They were making clear that their inclina-
tions rested on a foundation that simply does not admit of counter-
argument: brute sense impressions. 
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Jones was representing Victor Harris, a motorist who had been ren-
dered a quadriplegic when police officer Timothy Scott deliberately 
rammed Harris’s vehicle at the end of a high-speed chase, causing it to 
flip over an embankment and crash.1  Jones’s task was to defend the 
judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which had ruled 
that Scott was not entitled to summary judgment in Harris’s suit for 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.2  But within seconds of be-
ginning to explain why there was a “genuine issue” of fact3 on whether 
Harris’s flight posed a danger to the public sufficient to justify use of 
deadly force against him, Jones was confronted with what Justice after 
Justice cited as dispositive evidence to the contrary: a videotape of the 
chase filmed from inside police cruisers. 
“Mr. Jones,” Justice Alito started, “I looked at the videotape on this.  
It seemed to me that [Harris] created a tremendous risk [to] drivers on 
that road.”4  “He created the scariest chase I ever saw since ‘The 
French Connection,’” Justice Scalia immediately chimed in, provoking 
laughter throughout the courtroom.5 
Probably even more dispiriting was the exchange that came next 
with Justice Breyer, whose vote Jones had likely been counting on for 
affirmance.  “I was with you when I read . . . the opinion of the court 
below,” Justice Breyer related.6  “Then I look at that tape, and I have 
to say that when I looked at the tape, my reaction was somewhat simi-
lar to Justice Alito’s.”7  As Jones attempted to offer a less damaging in-
terpretation of the tape’s contents, reinforced by an invocation of the 
jury’s prerogatives as factfinder, Justice Breyer sharply retorted: 
  JUSTICE BREYER: . . . What am I supposed to assume? . . . I mean, 
I looked at the tape and that tape shows he is weaving on both sides of the 
lane, swerving around automobiles that are coming in the opposite direc-
tion with their lights on, goes through a red light where there are several 
cars that are right there, weaves around them, and there are cars coming 
the other way, weaves back, goes down the road. 
  . . . [A]m I supposed to pretend I haven’t seen that? . . .  
  MR. JONES: Well, I didn’t see that. 
  JUSTICE BREYER: You didn’t see that?  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007). 
 2 Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 127 S. Ct. 
1769. 
 3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (summary judgment appropriate when “the pleadings, the discov-
ery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). 
 4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631). 
 5 Id. at 28. 
 6 Id. at 30–31. 
 7 Id. at 31. 
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 . . . . 
  MR. JONES: But those are not the facts that were found by the court 
below in this — 
  JUSTICE BREYER: Well that’s, that’s what I wonder.  If the court 
says that isn’t what happened, and I see with my eyes that is what hap-
pened, what am I supposed to do?8 
Later, during the rebuttal argument of opposing counsel (at which 
point a helpless Jones was reduced to watching mute), Justice Breyer 
continued, “I look at the tape and I end up with Chico Marx’s old 
question with respect to the Court of Appeals: Who do you believe, me 
or your own eyes?”9 
When the opinion was handed down some ten weeks later, a ma-
jority of Justices had indeed decided to “call it” as they “saw it.”  Ac-
knowledging that although normally “courts are required to view the 
facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the [summary judgment] motion,’”10 Justice Scalia, 
writing for an eight-Justice majority, stated, “[t]here is . . . an added 
wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing 
the events in question.”11  “When opposing parties tell two different 
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version 
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment,”12 Justice Scalia reasoned.  “Respondent’s version of events is so 
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have 
believed him.”13 
Somewhat inconveniently for the majority, however, one Justice 
who had watched the tape had in fact taken Harris’s view.  “[T]he 
tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ ap-
praisal of the factual questions at issue,”14 Justice Stevens announced 
in dissent. 
But having grounded its decision in its senses, the majority saw no 
need to resort to reasoned elaboration of its position to rebut Stevens’s 
apprehension of facts “no reasonable juror” could have seen.  Instead, 
creating the Court’s first (and so far only) multimedia cyber-opinion, it 
supplied a URL for a digital rendering of the tape that had been up-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 Id. at 44–45. 
 9 Id. at 54. 
 10 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 
U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). 
 11 Id. at 1775. 
 12 Id. at 1776. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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loaded to the Court’s website.  “We are happy,” Scalia wrote, “to allow 
the videotape to speak for itself.”15 
Well, does the Scott v. Harris16 tape speak for itself?  If so, what 
does it say? 
We decided to conduct an empirical study to answer these ques-
tions.  We showed the video to a diverse sample of approximately 1350 
Americans.  We then asked them to tell us what they saw, and give us 
their views on the issues that the Court had identified as dispositive. 
Our subjects didn’t see things eye to eye.  A fairly substantial ma-
jority did interpret the facts the way the Court did.  But members of 
various subcommunities did not.  African Americans, low-income 
workers, and residents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form 
more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court.  So did indi-
viduals who characterized themselves as liberals and Democrats. 
Individuals with these characteristics tend to share a cultural orien-
tation that prizes egalitarianism and social solidarity.  Various highly 
salient, “symbolic” political issues — from gun control to affirmative 
action, from the death penalty to environmental protection — feature 
conflict between persons who share this recognizable cultural profile 
and those who hold an opposing one that features hierarchical and in-
dividualistic values.17  We found that persons who subscribed to the 
former style tended to perceive less danger in Harris’s flight, to attrib-
ute more responsibility to the police for creating the risk for the public, 
and to find less justification in the use of deadly force to end the chase.  
Indeed, these individuals were much more likely to see the police, 
rather than Harris, as the source of the danger posed by the flight and 
to find the deliberate ramming of Harris’s vehicle unnecessary to avert 
risk to the public. 
Thus, the question posed by the data is not, as Justice Breyer 
asked, whether to believe one’s eyes, but rather whose eyes the law 
should believe when identifiable groups of citizens form competing fac-
tual perceptions.  That’s a normative question, which this Article will 
also try to answer. 
We will argue that the Court in Scott was wrong to privilege its 
own view.  Although an admitted minority of American society, citi-
zens disposed to see the facts differently from the Scott majority share 
a perspective founded on common experiences and values.  By insist-
ing that a case like Scott be decided summarily, the Court not only de-
nied those citizens an opportunity, in the context of jury deliberations, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 Id. at 1775 n.5 (majority opinion).  
 16 127 S. Ct. 1769. 
 17 See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE 
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986) (describing historical and contemporary 
disputes between cultural groups). 
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to inform and possibly change the view of citizens endowed with a dif-
ferent perspective.  It also needlessly bound the result in the case to a 
process of decisionmaking that deprived the decision of any prospect 
of legitimacy in the eyes of that subcommunity whose members saw 
the facts differently.  Told that the law must be made in a fashion that 
rigorously excludes their understanding — which the opinion in Scott 
stigmatizes as being one only “unreasonable” people could hold — 
those who disagree with the outcome cannot divorce their assent to it 
from acceptance of their status as defeated outsiders.  We won’t at-
tempt to articulate a comprehensive theory of the function of the jury 
in promoting the democratic legitimacy of law.  But we will argue that 
no normatively credible theory of this sort can be reconciled with the 
Scott Court’s inattention to the shared identity of citizens likely to 
form a different understanding of the risks depicted in the videotape. 
This is not to say that we believe, necessarily, that there is no 
credible normative defense of the result in Scott.  One might take the 
position, for example, that Scott and cases like it should be decided 
summarily not because the understanding of social reality associated 
with a particular cultural subcommunity is inherently “unreasonable,” 
but because allowing the law to credit it could result in inconsistent 
jury verdicts across jurisdictions or within jurisdictions over time.  Al-
ternatively, one might take the position that courts should not allow 
the law to credit a subcommunity’s view of the facts because doing so 
could result in bad practical consequences for law enforcement.  Or 
one might argue that cases like Scott should be dismissed because the 
appropriateness of high-speed police chases should not be determined 
by courts, but by democratically accountable legislative bodies.  We 
aren’t fully convinced by these arguments.  But we are certain that 
any of these rationales would have been superior to the one the Court 
offered, because none would have incurred the cost to democratic le-
gitimacy associated with labeling the perspective of persons who share 
a particular cultural identity “unreasonable” and hence unworthy of 
consideration in the adjudicatory process. 
In addition to explaining how the Court got it wrong in Scott, we 
will also venture a diagnosis of why it did.  The Court’s mistake, we’ll 
argue, reflects a type of decisionmaking hubris that has cognitive ori-
gins and that has deleterious consequences that extend far beyond the 
Court’s decision in Scott.  Social psychology teaches us that our per-
ceptions of fact are pervasively shaped by our commitments to shared 
but contested views of individual virtue and social justice.  It also tells 
us that although our ability to perceive this type of value-motivated 
cognition in others is quite acute, our power to perceive it in ourselves 
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tends to be quite poor.18  We thus simultaneously experience overcon-
fidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions we 
hold in common with our confederates and unwarranted contempt for 
the perceptions associated with our opposites.  When these dispositions 
become integrated into law — as we believe they did in Scott — they 
generate needless cultural and political conflict that enervates the 
law’s political legitimacy.19  Judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens 
should therefore always be alert to the influence of this species of 
“cognitive illiberalism” and take the precautions necessary to minimize 
it. 
This Article will present and elaborate on these various claims over 
the course of three Parts.  Part I will look more closely at the issue and 
opinions in Scott, including the Court’s provocative invitation to read-
ers to view the tape and decide for themselves whether the majority or 
dissent got it right.  Part II will describe the theoretical underpinnings, 
the design, and the results of the empirical study we conducted in re-
sponse to the Court’s invitation.  Part III will then set forth our nor-
mative analysis of what the study results say about the correctness of 
the Scott decision, about the general impact of cognitive illiberalism in 
adjudication, and about the steps judges should take to try to counter-
act it. 
I.  IT’S OBVIOUS! 
We consider first the story of Scott v. Harris.  It begins with a rela-
tively familiar challenge — “catch me if you can” — on the roads of 
Georgia and ends with a very unusual one — “see for yourself” — in 
the pages of a Supreme Court opinion. 
Just before 11:00 p.m. on March 29, 2001, on a two-lane highway 
in the Atlanta suburbs, the police detected Victor Harris speeding.20  
But when the officers attempted to make a traffic stop, Harris hit the 
gas pedal, fleeing at high speed.21  Soon a car driven by Officer Timo-
thy Scott joined the chase.  Knowing little of the inciting situation, 
Scott had decided on his own initiative to help apprehend Harris.22  
Following a slow-speed interlude that included a side swiping in an 
empty shopping mall parking lot, the chase returned to the road, 
reaching speeds in excess of eighty-five miles per hour.23  The pursuit 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed 
Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414–16 (1995). 
 19 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2007). 
 20 Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 21 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810. 
 22 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 810. 
 23 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772–73; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810.  
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ended some six minutes and nine miles after it began, when Scott de-
cided to strike Harris’s rear bumper with his car, causing Harris, as in-
tended, to spin out of control and crash.24  Scott recognized that this 
maneuver involved a significant risk of serious injury or death to Har-
ris,25 who in fact suffered a broken neck that left him a quadriplegic.26 
Harris filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the use 
of admittedly deadly force to terminate the chase constituted an unrea-
sonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.27  After the district 
court denied Scott’s claim of qualified immunity,28 Scott took an inter-
locutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which af-
firmed.29  In addition to upholding the district court’s ruling on im-
munity,30 the court of appeals agreed that Scott was not entitled to 
summary judgment on the merits of Harris’s Fourth Amendment 
claim: 
  None of the antecedent conditions for the use of deadly force existed in 
this case.  Harris’ infraction was speeding (73 mph in a 55 mph zone).  
There were no warrants out for his arrest for anything, much less for the 
requisite “crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm.”  Indeed, neither Scott nor [a second officer] had any idea 
why Harris was being pursued.  The use of deadly force is not “reason-
able” in a high-speed chase based only on a speeding violation and traffic 
infractions where there was little, if any, actual threat to pedestrians or 
other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and Harris remained in 
control of his vehicle, and there is no question that there were alternatives 
for a later arrest.31 
The court also specifically rejected Scott’s argument that “Harris’ 
driving must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently reckless to 
give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a substantial threat 
of imminent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians”:32 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773; Harris, 433 F.3d at 810.  Scott had been authorized by his dis-
patcher to use a so-called “Precision Intervention Technique” (PIT) maneuver, a collision tech-
nique that is designed to cause a pursued vehicle to spin out and stop, but not necessarily to crash.  
See Harris, 433 F.3d at 810–11.  However, Scott (who was not trained in the PIT maneuver, see 
id.) decided that he was going too fast to execute the maneuver and that it was necessary to 
“ram[] his cruiser directly into Harris’s vehicle.”  Id. at 811.  
 25 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 814 n.8. 
 26 See id. at 811; Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01CV148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *2 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 25, 2003). 
 27 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.  
 28 See Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *6. 
 29 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 821.  The court did, however, reverse in part, holding that a second 
defendant, the officer who authorized the less dangerous PIT maneuver, was entitled to summary 
judgment.  See id. at 816–17. 
 30 See id. at 821. 
 31 Id. at 815 (citation omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985)).  
 32 Id. 
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This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.  As noted by the district 
court judge, taking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, Harris re-
mained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and 
typically used his indicators for turns.  He did not run any motorists off 
the road. . . . [B]y the time . . . Scott rammed Harris, the motorway had 
been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police 
blockades of the nearby intersections.33 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Framed by the questions 
presented for review and by the briefs, the case appeared to hinge on 
two issues.  One was whether Scott was entitled to immunity from suit 
on the ground that any violation of Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights 
was not based on law “clearly established” at the time of the chase.34  
The other was the relevance of Tennessee v. Garner,35 which held that 
police could not use deadly force in the form of shooting a fleeing sus-
pect “unless . . . the officer has probable cause to believe that the sus-
pect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 
officer or others.”36  The Eleventh Circuit had relied heavily upon 
Garner;37 Scott argued for a less restrictive standard in the context of a 
high-speed police chase.38 
But it was the chase videotape, an exhibit in support of the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment, that proved decisive.  For the 
Court, the facts revealed in the video made it so indisputably clear 
that Scott was entitled to summary judgment that it found no need to 
resolve the immunity issue.39  Justice Scalia wrote: 
[W]e see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the 
dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast.  We see it swerve around 
more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars 
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 Id. at 815–16 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  
 34 See Brief for Petitioner at 24, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631), 2006 WL 
3693418 (“Scott’s decision to use his push bumper to protect the lives of innocent persons from the 
risks created by Harris’s dangerous driving did not violate ‘clearly established’ law.  To find oth-
erwise would reduce the requirement of ‘fair and clear warning’ that Scott’s conduct violated the 
Fourth Amendment to no warning at all.”). 
 35 471 U.S. 1. 
 36 Id. at 3. 
 37 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 816–17.  
 38 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 14 (“Garner’s framework should be reserved for 
cases in which the officer would know with certainty that his use of force will be deadly.  Apply-
ing Garner to vehicle-contact cases such as this one would provide the police with very little guid-
ance on when they can use direct contact to stop a fleeing vehicle.”). 
 39 The Court reasoned that “because the constitutional question with which we are presented 
is . . . easily decided,” it was not necessary to “address the wisdom” of the disputed precedent, 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), which generally requires the merits of a constitutional claim 
to be considered prior to any immunity claim.  Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774 n.4.  Although he agreed 
with the Court’s assessment of the merits, Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, took issue 
with the Court’s failure to consider Scott’s immunity argument first.  See id. at 1780–81 (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of 
time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous po-
lice cars forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep 
up.  Far from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court de-
picts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style 
car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent 
bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.40 
Referring to the conventional rule that disputed facts should be con-
strued in favor of the nonmoving party in evaluating a motion for 
summary judgment, Justice Scalia concluded that “[t]he Court of Ap-
peals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have 
viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”41 
The Court also found that the tape so manifestly demonstrated the 
“reasonableness” of the use of deadly force that there was no need to 
puzzle over how to adapt Garner to a car chase.42  The Court evalu-
ated the reasonableness of Scott’s actions by looking at several factors, 
starting first with the risks posed to the police, the public, and Harris 
by the chase: 
Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is 
clear from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent 
threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to 
other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.  It is 
equally clear that Scott’s actions posed a high likelihood of serious injury 
or death to respondent — though not the near certainty of death posed by, 
say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head . . . .43 
The Court then attempted to balance these factors by framing the 
issue as one of comparative fault: 
So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps lesser probability of 
injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger prob-
ability of injuring or killing a single person?  We think it appropriate in 
this process to take into account not only the number of lives at risk, but 
also their relative culpability.  It was respondent, after all, who intention-
ally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the 
reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between 
two evils that Scott confronted.  Multiple police cars, with blue lights 
flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 
miles, but he ignored their warning to stop.  By contrast, those who might 
have been harmed had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely  
innocent.44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775–76 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
 41 Id. at 1776. 
 42 Id. at 1778. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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The Court apparently viewed the conclusion of this “relative culpabil-
ity” analysis as likewise so far beyond dispute that no contrary jury de-
termination would be sustainable: “We have little difficulty in conclud-
ing it was reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”45 
As noted, Justice Stevens, alone, dissented.  Justice Stevens re-
ported his own impression that “the tape actually confirms, rather than 
contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual questions at is-
sue.”46  In what must have struck the majority as a strangely flattering 
rebuke, Justice Stevens, at eighty-seven the Court’s oldest Justice, at-
tributed his colleagues’ contrary perceptions to their comparative 
youth: “Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving took 
place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways — when split-
second judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of 
oncoming traffic were routine — they might well have reacted to the 
videotape more dispassionately.”47 
Just as strangely, if not as flatteringly, the Court majority did not 
counter Justice Stevens’s dissent with argument.  As noted, the Court 
replied curtly, “[w]e are happy to allow the videotape to speak for it-
self.”48  Answering Chico Marx’s question, Justice Breyer, in a concur-
ring opinion, seconded the Court’s “see for yourself” rejoinder: 
Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference to 
my own view of the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advan-
tage of the link in the Court’s opinion and watch it.  Having done so, I do 
not believe a reasonable jury could, in this instance, find that Officer 
Timothy Scott (who joined the chase late in the day and did not know the 
specific reason why the respondent was being pursued) acted in violation 
of the Constitution.49 
Indeed, Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg, who also wrote sepa-
rately, were arguably even more emphatic about the impact of the 
video.  Whereas the majority opinion appeared to endorse a general 
rule that all uses of deadly force to end dangerous high-speed chases 
should be treated as constitutional,50 these Justices stressed the need to 
review such pursuits case by case.  “[T]he video,” Justice Breyer wrote, 
“makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of this constitutional de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 1781 n.1.  
 48 Id. at 1775 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 49 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 50 See id. at 1779 (majority opinion) (“[W]e lay down a . . . sensible rule: A police officer’s at-
tempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystand-
ers does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of 
serious injury or death.”). 
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termination.”51  Justice Ginsburg echoed this point in her separate 
concurrence: 
I do not read today’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per se rule.  
The inquiry described by the Court is situation specific.  Among relevant 
considerations: Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedes-
trians, police officers) at risk?  Was there a safer way, given the time, 
place, and circumstances, to stop the fleeing vehicle?  “[A]dmirable” as 
“[an] attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment 
context [may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh our 
way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”52 
For Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, then, the video mandated sum-
mary judgment not merely because it foreclosed reasonable disagree-
ment about whether a dangerous chase had occurred, but also because, 
for them at least, it foreclosed reasonable disagreement on whether 
chasing Harris at all promoted public safety, whether Harris or the po-
lice were more culpable for the danger of the chase to the public, and 
ultimately whether the use of deadly force was justified in light of the 
risk that Harris posed. 
II.  TAKING THE SCOTT CHALLENGE 
For those familiar with the Court’s commitments both to reasoned 
justification and to safeguarding its exclusive power to interpret the 
Constitution, the invitation to members of the public at large to judge 
the correctness of the decision for themselves by simply applying their 
senses was a conclusion to the case every bit as spectacular as the 
metal-contorting crash that ended Harris’s flight from the police.53  
There is, however, an obvious problem with the Court’s invitation.  In 
reporting that he, at least, saw something different, Justice Stevens 
was plainly advancing the claim that the tape doesn’t speak for itself 
— that different people, with different experiences, can see different 
things in it.  No individual who watches the tape and comes away 
agreeing with the Court will be in a position to rebut Justice Stevens’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 52 Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting id. 
at 1777–78 (majority opinion)). 
 53 Not surprisingly, this aspect of the Court’s decision has provoked debate in the legal  
academy.  Compare Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/ 
1172720514.shtml (Feb. 28, 2007, 22:23) (“The right answer is that Justice Breyer should believe 
his own eyes.”), with The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 222 
(2007) (arguing that the Court’s analytical approach pushed it to make a bad ruling on an incom-
plete record), Jessica Silber, Justices Taken in by Illusion of Film, Balt. Sun, May 13, 2007, at 
21A (“[A]ll film manifests a distinct point of view . . . . Films never speak for themselves . . . .”), 
and Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2007/04/the_death_of_fa.html (Apr. 30, 2007, 13:41) (“[E]ach Justice saw the risk of 
speeding through his or her own cultural prism.”).  See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Video 
Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 Judicature 108 (2008). 
  
2009] WHOSE EYES ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? 849 
claim, because however clearly that person perceives things, the fact 
remains that she is able to see only what she sees and not what anyone 
else does.  The testing method the Court proposes, in sum, is hope-
lessly solipsistic. 
There is only one way we can think of to accept the Scott major-
ity’s proposal that its conclusion be tested by viewing the tape.  It is to 
get a large number of people of diverse experiences and characteristics 
to watch it.  If there are members of this group who do see things dif-
ferently from the majority, one can then try to determine whether there 
is anything that seems to unite the former other than that they are 
simply “unreasonable.” 
That’s what we decided to do.  We conducted a study to see who 
sees what in the Scott tape and why.  In this Part, we describe that 
study.  We start essentially with the bottom line — a narrative account 
of what people of varying characteristics and backgrounds would 
likely see were they to watch the Scott tape.  We then identify the so-
cial psychological theories that explain why one might expect certain 
defining characteristics to affect such individuals’ perceptions of facts.  
Then we show how these theories informed the design and hypotheses 
of our study.  Finally, we offer a more fine-grained reporting of the 
study results themselves, before summing up. 
One point of clarification, however, must be stressed at the outset.  
Although our subjects were instructed to view the video from the per-
spective of a juror deciding the case, we do not understand the results 
of the study to indicate how a case like Scott would come out if it 
went to trial.  Obviously, jurors in an actual case would be exposed to 
more evidence than just the video.  They would also hear arguments 
from counsel.  Most important of all, they would deliberate.  They 
might conclude, on such a basis, to vote for a verdict contrary to their 
initial reaction to the tape, particularly if that reaction were equivocal.  
Our study is designed only to help evaluate the assertion that the  
tape “speak[s] for itself”54 — and that what it says is so unequivocal 
that it leaves no room to “believe a reasonable jury could, in this in-
stance, find that Officer Timothy Scott . . . acted in violation of the 
Constitution.”55 
A.  Four Members of the American Venire 
Imagine four Americans (Figure 1).  Ron, a white male who lives in 
Arizona, overcame his modest upbringing to become a self-made mil-
lionaire businessperson.  He deeply resents government interference 
with markets but is otherwise highly respectful of authority, which he 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5. 
 55 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Ron Bernie
Linda Pat
believes should be clearly delineated in all spheres of life.  Politically, 
he identifies himself as a conservative Republican.  Bernie, another 
white male, is a university professor who makes a modest salary and 
lives in Burlington, Vermont.  He will go along with the left wing of 
the Democratic Party, but thinks of himself as a “social democrat.”  He 
advocates highly egalitarian conditions in the home, in the workplace, 
and in society at large, and strongly supports government social wel-
fare programs and regulations of every stripe.  Linda is an African 
American woman employed as a social worker in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania.  She is a staunch Democrat and unembarrassed to be charac-
terized as a “liberal.”  Finally, there is Pat.  Pat is the average Ameri-
can in every single respect: Pat earns the average income, has the 
average level of education, is average in ideology, is average in party 
identification, holds average cultural values, and is average even in 
race and gender.  If placed on a jury, apprised of the basic issues and 
law, and asked to watch the video in Scott v. Harris, what will these 
four individuals see on the tape, and how will the tape affect their 
views of how the case should come out prior to deliberating? 
 
Figure 1.  Four Representative Members  
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Here is the answer.  Ron will see exactly what the Scott majority 
saw: a very dangerous driver, whom the police correctly pursued from 
the outset and against whom they appropriately used deadly force.  
Pat will tend in the same direction, but with less certainty; in particu-
lar, Pat will be ambivalent about whether the risk to the public was 
worth the chase, but will conclude, fairly unequivocally, that terminat-
ing it with deadly force was warranted given the danger that Harris’s 
flight posed. 
Linda and Bernie, however, will feel quite differently.  They will be 
fairly adamant that the police, after detecting that Harris was speed-
ing, made a serious mistake in conducting a high-speed chase when he 
refused to pull over.  They will tend to agree that the chase posed le-
thal risks to the public and the police, but in contrast to Ron and Pat, 
they will be somewhat equivocal in that judgment.  They will not be 
equivocal about blame: they will perceive the police to be as culpable 
as Harris or even more culpable for the risk the chase created for the 
public.  And they will be fairly strongly disposed to find that the police 
were not justified in using deadly force to terminate the chase in light 
of the danger Harris himself posed. 
At least, those are the impressions they’ll have before they start to 
exchange their views with one another and explain them in delibera-
tions.  In what follows, we identify the theoretical grounds from which 
to expect this initial array of perceptions and then turn to the details of 
the study that support this particular account of what individuals like 
these will likely “see” in the Scott tape. 
B.  Theoretical Background: Motivated Cognition  
of Legally Consequential Facts 
Why, to start, might we expect people with characteristics as di-
verse as Ron’s, Linda’s, Pat’s, and Bernie’s not to see “eye to eye” on 
the Scott video?  There are a number of social psychological mecha-
nisms that explain how the group identities and values associated with 
such characteristics influence cognition of facts.  They form the theo-
retical basis for the design of our study and its hypotheses. 
One of these mechanisms is the culpable control model of blame.56  
That theory starts with the premise — confirmed by a diverse body of 
research in psychology, anthropology, and linguistics57 — that people 
are generally disposed to “blame” someone for an action only if they 
perceive that the putatively blameworthy agent made a voluntary 
choice to act in a manner that caused some harm or injury.  Neverthe-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 556 (2000). 
 57 See, e.g., id. at 556–57 (discussing previous research on blame). 
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less, experiments demonstrate that people’s perceptions of the elements 
of this blaming template are highly sensitive to circumstances extrinsic 
to the template itself.  In particular, people are much more disposed to 
perceive voluntariness, action, causation, and harm (as well as other 
conditions of blaming) when the putatively blameworthy agent is be-
having in ways that defy social norms (perhaps by engaging in an in-
terracial relationship or by using drugs), including norms contested 
across distinct subcommunities.58  In effect, cognition of blame-
relevant “facts” (volition, action, causation, harm) is motivated by the 
subconscious desire to form blame attributions that accord with moral 
evaluations of the agent’s character or lifestyle. 
A second theory is identity-protective cognition.59  Individual well-
being, material and emotional, is bound up with membership in vari-
ous self-defining groups.  Rejecting factual beliefs widespread within 
such a group can undermine individual well-being, either by threaten-
ing to estrange a person from his peers or by forcing that person to 
contemplate the social incompetence of those he identifies with.  As a 
means of psychological self-defense, then, people tend to process in-
formation in a selective fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant within 
their self-defining groups.60 
Finally, there is the cultural cognition of risk.61  This theory posits 
that people tend to conform factual beliefs about risk to their cultural 
evaluations of putatively dangerous behavior.  As a result of various 
cognitive mechanisms, people are motivated to believe that behavior 
they find noble is also socially beneficial (or at least benign) and be-
havior they find base is also socially harmful.  For example, people 
who hold individualist values discount claims that commerce and in-
dustry harm the environment because they value markets and other 
forms of private ordering.  People who hold egalitarian values, in con-
trast, readily credit claims of environmental risk, the widespread ac-
ceptance of which would justify restricting behavior — such as com-
merce and industry — that those people associate with inequalities in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 See id. at 564; see also Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 368 (1992). 
 59 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Cul-
ture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007). 
 60 See generally Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reduc-
ing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 
(2000); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and 
Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
84 (1997); Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lillian Hsu, Michelle 
McGoey & Lee Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-
Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 415 (2007). 
 61 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democ-
racy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083–87 (2006). 
  
2009] WHOSE EYES ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? 853 
wealth.  Alternatively, people who subscribe to hierarchical values im-
pute risk to homosexuality, drug use, abortion, subversive speech, and 
other behaviors that defy the authority of traditional, stratified norms 
of behavior, whereas egalitarians and individualists reject these risk 
claims as specious.62 
Combined, these theories furnish strong grounds to expect indi-
viduals of diverse identities and commitments — like Ron, Linda, 
Bernie, and Pat — to form different perceptions of the facts revealed 
by the Scott tape.  The facts highlighted by Justice Scalia’s analysis — 
how much care Harris was taking to avoid colliding with other vehi-
cles,63 how feasible it was for other drivers to pull to the side to avoid 
exposure to collision,64 the relative harm of chasing Harris or breaking 
off the pursuit and letting him escape65 — all relate to moral (and le-
gal) attributions of blame.  Perceptions of those facts, the culpable con-
trol model suggests, are likely to be motivated by extrinsic moral 
evaluations of the putatively blameworthy actors — Harris and the  
police. 
Beliefs about the extent to which the police in general abuse their 
authority (particularly against minorities), and correspondingly the 
relative preponderance of licit and illicit reasons for attempting to 
avoid police encounters, vary across sociodemographic and political 
groups.66  Identity-protective cognition thus suggests that people are 
likely to construe the facts depicted in the tape in a way that reinforces 
the beliefs that predominate among their peers. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 See id. at 1086–87.  This theory is amply supported by a growing body of empirical re-
search.  See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of 
Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991); 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Images of Nevada, 
in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCI-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (James Flynn, Paul Slovic & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001); 
Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59; Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Paul 
Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotech-
nology, 4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY (forthcoming Feb. 2009); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, 
The Role of Affect and Worldviews As Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of 
Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1445 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, Donald Bra-
man, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Second National Risk and Culture 
Study: Making Sense of — and Making Progress in — The American Culture War of Fact (Yale 
Law Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 154; George Washington Univ., Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 370; George Washington Univ., Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 370, 2007) 
[hereinafter Kahan et al., Risk and Culture Study], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189. 
 63 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775–76 (2007). 
 64 See id. at 1775. 
 65 Id. at 1778–79. 
 66 See Daniel Lempert, Belief in a Just World and Perceptions of Fair Treat- 
ment by Police (2007), available at http://www.electionstudies.org/resources/papers/Pilot2006/ 
nes012058.pdf (reporting in Part I results of survey on perceived fairness of police toward crimi-
nal suspects).  Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132–34 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting community-specific reactions to avoidance of police).  
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Finally, the facts at issue relate to the risks posed by the parties to 
the chase.  Consistent with the theory of cultural cognition, we can ex-
pect individuals to form risk perceptions that reflect the competing, 
culturally grounded affective responses a high-speed police chase is 
likely to evoke: from fear of those who defy lawful authority; to re-
sentment of abuses of power by the police; to distrust of authority gen-
erally; to anger at apparent indifference to the well-being of innocent 
bystanders.67 
C.  Study Design and Hypotheses 
These understandings of the potential sources of motivated cogni-
tion suggest a relatively straightforward way to determine whether the 
Scott tape admits of competing interpretations.  By showing the tape 
to a sufficiently large and diverse group of persons and soliciting their 
reactions to it, one can determine whether differences of belief on key 
issues vary across persons in patterns predicted by cultural cognition, 
identity-protective cognition, and the culpable control theory.  As we 
explain in greater detail, this is how we proceeded. 
1.  Sample. — The study sample consisted of approximately 1350 
individuals.  The subjects were drawn randomly from a demographi-
cally diverse panel of some 40,000 online adult Americans assembled 
by Knowledge Networks for participation in scholarly public opinion 
analysis.68  The sample was 51% male and 49% female; and 9% His-
panic, 6% African American, and 6% other minority.  The mean age 
was 47, mean annual household income $40,000 to $49,000, and the 
mean education level was “some college.”  The subjects participated in 
the study over a one-month period between late September 2007 and 
late October 2007. 
2.  Stimulus. — Subjects were exposed to a stimulus consisting of 
two parts.  The first was a textual introduction.  The introduction ad-
vised subjects that the point of the survey was to determine how they 
“would decide a real-life lawsuit if [they] were on the jury.”  In addi-
tion to setting forth the nature of the suit — one brought by Harris al-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 741 (2008) (describing evidence of the role that affective states play in connecting risk 
perceptions to cultural values). 
 68 Knowledge Networks is a leading firm in online opinion studies.  Numerous studies have 
shown that the online samples and testing methods of Knowledge Networks yield results equiva-
lent in reliability to conventional random-digit-dial surveys, and studies based on those samples 
and methods are routinely published in academic journals.  See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, 
KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY: ARTICLES AND PRESENTATIONS BASED ON KN 
COLLECTED PANEL DATA, ANALYSIS, OR METHODOLOGY, available at http://www. 
knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/KN%20Bibliog%205-29-2007%20External.pdf; J.M. Dennis, 
Methodological Information About Knowledge Networks for Reviewers, http://www. 
knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2008). 
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leging that he had suffered injuries when Scott used “unreasonable 
force” to end a high-speed chase — the introduction set forth a list of 
facts on which “the parties agree.”  The list consisted of facts not dis-
puted by the parties when the case was before the Supreme Court:69 
The police clocked Harris driving 73 miles per hour on a highway in a 55 
mile-per-hour zone at around 11 pm. 
The police decided to pursue Harris when Harris ignored the police car’s 
flashing lights and kept driving rather than pulling over. 
The chase lasted around seven minutes and covered eight to nine miles. 
The police determined from the license plate number that the vehicle had 
not been reported stolen. 
Officer Scott joined the chase after it started.  He did not know why the 
other officers had originally tried to stop Harris. 
Scott knew that other police officers had blocked intersections leading to 
the highway but did not know if all of the intersections were blocked. 
Officer Scott deliberately used his police cruiser’s front bumper to hit the 
rear of Harris’s car[,] hoping to cause Harris’s car to spin out and come to 
a stop. 
Officer Scott knew there was a high risk that ramming the car in this 
manner could seriously injure or kill Harris. 
Harris lost control, crashed, and suffered severe injuries, including perma-
nent paralysis from the neck down.70 
The second part of the stimulus consisted of the chase video.  The 
video was identified as having been filmed from inside the pursuing 
police cruisers.  It was also described as “key evidence” relating to 
facts on which the “[p]arties disagree.”  Subjects were requested to 
“closely watch the video . . . just as [members of the jury in the case] 
would.”71 
The video is approximately six minutes in length.  It starts when 
the police activate their sirens and terminates with a scene of Harris’s 
flipped-over vehicle engulfed in thick smoke.  The study video dis-
played an image comparable in size to the video uploaded to the Su-
preme Court website.  Like the Supreme Court video, the study video 
also included sound, which consisted of radio communication between 
the pursuing cars and the police dispatcher.  Shortly before Scott rams 
Harris’s vehicle, the dispatcher is heard issuing the instruction to “take 
him out.” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772–73; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 2–5; Brief for Respondent 
at 12, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631), 2007 WL 118977. 
 70 The survey instrument is on file with the Harvard Law School Library. 
 71 The study video can be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBY2y2YsmN0. 
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The video shown to the subjects was actually a composite of two 
from the trial record, both of which were uploaded to the Supreme 
Court’s website.72  The two tapes were recorded by the two pursuing 
police cars, which, at around the midpoint of the chase, swap positions 
relative to the fleeing Harris.  The study video consists of those por-
tions of each tape recorded when the filming vehicle was the lead car 
in the chase and omits those portions of each recorded when the car 
filming was in the trailing position.  It was necessary to combine the 
tapes in this fashion to keep the total running time of the study short 
enough to avert high dropout rates among study subjects.  Because 
only the footage shot from inside the lead vehicle permits observation 
of Harris, the study video nevertheless contained all portions of both 
tapes that bear on the factual disagreements between the Scott major-
ity and dissent. 
Like the tapes in the Supreme Court record, but unlike the file dis-
played on the Supreme Court website, the study tape was in color.  As 
a result, it permitted subjects to observe the color of overhead traffic 
lights and also clearly to discern the tail lights (including the braking 
lights) of Harris’s car and of vehicles passed during the pursuit.  The 
black and white file displayed on the Supreme Court website, in addi-
tion to masking these pertinent details, contains myriad indistinct 
patches of bright or flashing light; in the color video, these flashes are 
revealed to be objects such as illuminated roadside street signs, lights 
in roadside structures, and the headlights of cars that are either pulled 
over, approaching the chase from an intersecting street, or traveling in 
the opposite direction.  Beyond furnishing a more vivid (and poten-
tially more chilling) depiction of the chase than the file uploaded to the 
Court’s website, the study tape in this respect also more closely resem-
bled the footage observed by the Justices themselves. 
3.  Response Measures. — On exactly which facts the Court under-
stood the video to be dispositive in Scott is itself open to debate.  Al-
though Justice Scalia considered a range of issues — the degree of risk 
Harris’s driving posed;73 how to “weigh[] the perhaps lesser probability 
of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger 
probability of injuring or killing a single person”;74 the “relative culpa-
bility” of Harris and the police for creating risk to the public75 — his 
opinion could be read to indicate that the constitutionality of deadly 
force turns on only one fact: whether the police and the fleeing driver 
were involved in a “high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 We were kindly supplied with the record versions of the tapes by Andrew Clarke, counsel 
for Harris. 
 73 See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775–76. 
 74 Id. at 1778. 
 75 Id.  
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nocent bystanders.”76  Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, however, indi-
cated that they did not understand the Court’s decision “as articulating 
a mechanical, per se rule.”77  For them, the entire “inquiry described 
by the Court”78 involved “highly fact-dependent” questions, the an-
swers to which were “ma[de] clear” by a viewing of the video.79  We 
decided to solicit our subjects’ reactions to the entire range of determi-
nations that figured in the Court’s reasoning, both because the opinion 
was arguably ambiguous about which of them were matters of fact for 
the jury to decide and because the possibility that people might dis-
agree about them after watching the video struck us as relevant to 
evaluating which of those facts ought to be ones for a jury in a case 
like Scott. 
One of the key issues was the degree of risk that Harris’s driving 
posed.  Justice Scalia used various formulations to characterize the de-
gree of lethal danger that a jury would be required to find in a case 
like Scott.80  “Great risk of death” struck us as the one most likely to 
be understood clearly and uniformly among the laypersons in our sub-
ject pool.81  Accordingly, to assess our subjects’ perceptions of that 
risk, we asked them to indicate, on a six-point scale, their level of dis-
agreement or agreement with these two statements: 
During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the 
public at great risk of death. 
During the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put the police at serious 
risk of death. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 Id. at 1779 (“[W]e lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a 
dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or 
death.”). 
 77 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also infra p. 848. 
 78 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 80 See, e.g., id. at 1775–76 (majority opinion) (“[T]he video . . . closely resembles a Hollywood-
style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike 
at great risk of serious injury.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1778 (“[I]t is clear from the videotape that 
respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians . . . , to other civil-
ian motorists, and to the officers . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 1779 (“The car chase that respon-
dent initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to oth-
ers; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.” (emphasis added)).  
 81 Because the Court emphasized that the tape left no ground for reasonable disagreement on 
“the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life,” id. 
at 1776 (emphasis added), we interpret the Court’s references to the “risk of serious injury,” id. at 
1772, 1776, and a “substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury,” id. at 1779, as con-
templating a degree of injury that would be life-threatening.  To avoid the possibility that subjects 
would construe the term “physical injury” as extending to non-life-threatening harm, we chose not 
to use this phrase and instead to refer simply to “great risk of death,” which we judged would uni-
formly be understood to embrace the risk of life-threatening physical injury. 
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The majority opinion in Scott also evaluated the degree of risk the 
police created and its magnitude in relation to the risk posed by Har-
ris.  To assess our subjects’ perceptions of that issue, we asked them to 
indicate their level of disagreement or agreement (again on a six-point 
scale) with this statement: 
It just wasn’t worth the danger to the public for the police to engage in a 
high-speed chase of Harris when he refused to pull over for speeding.  In-
stead, they should have tried to find and arrest him later. 
They were also asked to indicate their assessment of the “relative 
culpability”82 of the police and Harris: 
Please indicate how much you think the parties were at fault for the risk 
posed to the public by the chase: (1) the police were much more at fault 
than Harris; (2) the police were slightly more at fault than Harris; (3) the 
police and Harris were equally at fault; (4) Harris was slightly more at 
fault than the police; (5) Harris was much more at fault than the police. 
Finally, we asked subjects to indicate their level of disagreement or 
agreement with a statement relating to the outcome of the case: 
The danger that Harris’s driving posed to the police and the public justi-
fied Officer Scott’s decision to end the chase in a way that put Harris’s 
own life in danger. 
Responses to these five items, when combined, formed a highly re-
liable scale (α = 0.81).83  To facilitate analysis, the scale was coded to 
reflect agreement with the Scott majority and labeled “Agree with 
Court.”84 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 82 Id. at 1778. 
 83 Cronbach’s alpha (α) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal scales.  
In effect, it measures the degree of intercorrelation that exists among various items within a scale; 
a high score suggests that the items can be treated as a valid measure of a latent, or unmeasured, 
attitude or trait.  Generally, α ≥ 0.70 suggests scale validity.  See generally Jose M. Cortina, What 
Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98 
(1993).  Because a high Cronbach’s alpha confirms that responses to items of opposing valence 
(e.g., that “[d]uring the pursuit, Harris drove in a manner that put members of the public at great 
risk of death” versus “[i]t just wasn’t worth the danger to the public for the police to engage in a 
high-speed chase of Harris when he refused to pull over for speeding”) are indeed negatively cor-
related, it helps to dispel the concern that subjects’ responses reflected acquiescence bias, the ten-
dency “to ‘agree’ with a statement just to avoid seeming disagreeable,” RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, 
INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 265 (6th ed. 2008). 
 84 Because subjects responded after watching a car crash that they were told resulted in seri-
ous injury, one might reasonably wonder whether their responses were affected by “hindsight 
bias,” which consists in overestimating the ex ante likelihood of an event based on ex post knowl-
edge of its occurrence.  See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).  However, the Scott majority based its rul-
ing not on its anxiety that jurors might overreact to the tape (an alternative basis for decision we 
discuss below, see infra p. 891), but on its professed confidence that jurors would rule for the de-
fendant on the basis of the tape.  The possibility of hindsight bias — whatever it might imply 
about what jurors in a case like Scott should be allowed to see — does not pose any difficulty for 
a study aimed at testing disputed claims about how jurors would react if allowed to view it. 
Moreover, because it is an influence to which all subjects are exposed, the possible impact of 
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4.  Individual Characteristics. — (a)  Demographic Characteristics. 
— We collected data relating to the individual characteristics of the 
subjects.  These included conventional sociodemographic characteris-
tics, such as gender, race, age, household income, education, commu-
nity type (urban or nonurban) of residence, and region of residence. 
(b)  Political Ideology and Party Affiliation. — Subjects indi- 
cated their party affiliation — either Republican, Democrat, or neither.  
They also indicated their political ideology on a seven-point  
scale that ran from “extremely liberal” to extremely conservative  
(“conservativism”). 
(c)  Cultural Worldviews. — We also collected data on our subjects’ 
cultural orientations and worldviews.  The orientations reflected a 
scheme developed by the late anthropologist Mary Douglas, who char-
acterized worldviews, or preferences for how society should be organ-
ized, along two cross-cutting dimensions — “group” and “grid.”85  A 
“high group” worldview generates a preference for a communitarian 
ordering in which the interests of the individual are subordinated to 
the needs of the collective, which is in turn responsible for securing the 
conditions of individual flourishing.  A “low group” worldview, in con-
trast, coheres with a preference for an individualist ordering in which 
individuals are expected to secure the conditions of their own flourish-
ing without interference or assistance from the collective.  A “high 
grid” worldview corresponds to a preference for a relatively hierarchi-
cal ordering, in which entitlements, obligations, opportunities, and of-
fices are all assigned on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed at-
tributes, such as gender, race, lineage, class, and the like.  A “low grid” 
worldview, in contrast, generates a preference for an egalitarian order-
ing that emphatically rejects the proposition that such distinctions 
should figure in this way in societal conditions.86 
The two dimensions of worldview contemplated by “group-grid” 
were measured (in pre-screening surveys conducted several weeks in 
advance of the study) with two scales, “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” (or 
simply, “Hierarchy”) and “Individualism-Communitarianism” (“Indi-
vidualism”), used in previous studies of the cultural cognition of risk.87  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
hindsight bias also does not pose any obstacle to testing hypotheses about individual differences in 
perceptions based on cultural worldviews and other pertinent characteristics. 
 85 See generally MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 
(1996). 
 86 See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF 
RISK 83 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). 
 87 The scales consist of multiple “agree-disagree” items that express attitudes associated with 
one or another worldview (e.g., “[a] lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in 
the traditional family, where the man works and the woman stays home,” for hierarchy; “[w]e 
need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, 
and men and women,” for egalitarianism; “[t]oo many people today expect society to do things for 
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As in previous studies, the scales were highly reliable measures of the 
latent disposition of subjects toward those respective sets of world-
views (Individualism, α = 0.86; Hierarchy, α = 0.85).  To facilitate 
comparisons of subjects identified by their worldviews, we assigned 
subjects to cultural groups.  Based on the relationship of their scores to 
the median on each scale, we classified subjects as either “Hierarchs” 
or “Egalitarians” and as either “Individualists” or “Communitarians.” 
5.  Hypotheses. — We formulated two major hypotheses.  One was 
that even if a majority of subjects agreed with the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court majority in Scott, reactions to the study tape would 
display significant variation across persons of different characteristics.  
The second major hypothesis was that these characteristics would be 
suggestive of the impact of culpable control, identity-protective, and 
cultural cognition.  
What these characteristics would be and how they would matter 
support a number of subhypotheses.  Some of the relevant characteris-
tics, we surmised, would be sociodemographic.  We thus anticipated 
differences along dimensions such as age and community type (urban 
or nonurban).  Such differences could be a consequence of the mun-
dane contribution that experience in general makes to understanding 
events: witnessed events are, in effect, the equivalent of minor prem-
ises in a cognitive syllogism that generates conclusions only when 
combined with major premises drawn from experience.  Justice Ste-
vens clearly had this point in mind when he argued that older people 
who learned to pass slow-moving automobiles on poorly lit, windy, 
two-lane country roads are likely to see Harris’s driving as creating 
less risk than those who grew up in an era of straight, brightly illumi-
nated, four-lane highways.  One might expect differences in various 
other experientially relevant characteristics — such as education — to 
have some effect too. 
But other demographic characteristics, we expected, would also 
contribute to differences in perception through mechanisms of moti-
vated cognition.  Race and gender, for example, are variously depicted 
both as sources of group identity and as proxies for identities that con-
sist in shared values.88  African Americans, we predicted, would be in-
clined to view the facts in a manner different from the Scott majority 
because they are more likely to have had negative experiences with po-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
them that they should be doing for themselves,” for individualism; and “[i]t’s society’s responsibil-
ity to make sure everyone’s basic needs are met,” for communitarianism).  Kahan, Braman, Gastil, 
Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 504–05. 
 88 See, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993) 
(1903) (offering classic statement of African American identity based on shared values); CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOP-
MENT (1993) (developing theory of gender identities focused on contrasting values). 
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lice, to know other persons who have, and (as a result) to have friends 
and family members who believe the police are disposed to abuse their 
authority.89  Perceiving the facts in the video in a manner that suggests 
the police response was out of proportion to the risk created by Harris 
is congenial to this evaluation, and thus predicted by both the culpa-
ble-control and identity-protective cognition theories. 
We also predicted that gender would influence perceptions of the 
facts in the Scott tape.  Women, we surmised, were likely to view the 
facts in a manner relatively more favorable to Harris than were men.  
The basis for this conjecture is that gender correlates with values — 
including cultural egalitarianism90 and ideological liberalism91 — that 
we have reason to think (as described below) would motivate cognition 
hostile to the behavior of the police in this case. 
Other characteristics we expected to matter are explicitly connected 
to group commitments that figure in theories of motivated cognition.  
These include political ideology and political party affiliation.  Under-
standings predominant among politically defined groups are among 
those to which individuals, for identity-protective reasons, tend to con-
form their own beliefs about policy-related and legally consequential 
facts.92  Cultural worldviews also matter from the standpoint of moti-
vated cognition.  As noted, previous work suggests that cultural 
worldviews more powerfully explain differences of risk perception93 
and legally consequential facts94 than do other characteristics.  Gender, 
race, income, and region of residence are likely proxies for the affini-
ties constituted by such values.95  Moreover, they also furnish greater 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 89 See Sandra Lee Browning et al., Race and Getting Hassled by the Police: A Research Note, 
POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. OF POLICE DEV., NO. 1, at 1, 1–11 (1994); Yolander G. Hurst, 
James Frank & Sandra Lee Browning, The Attitudes of Juveniles Toward the Police: A Compari-
son of Black and White Youth, 23 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 37, 44–
50 (2000). 
 90 See Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The ‘White Male’ Effect, 
2 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159, 166–67 (2000). 
 91 See Richard A. Brody & Jennifer L. Lawless, Political Ideology in the United States: Con-
servatism and Liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, in CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND RIGHT-
WING POLITICS IN NORTH AMERICA: REAPING THE BENEFITS OF AN IDEOLOGICAL VIC-
TORY? 53 (Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Roland Sturm & Dagmar Eberle eds., 2003). 
 92 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). 
 93 See generally Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59. 
 94 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 54–56 (2008). 
 95 See RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH (1996) (using region as a proxy for shared values); Kahan, Bra-
man, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 471 (suggesting that race and gender correlate with 
shared values). 
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heuristic guidance than do political ideologies for persons who (like 
most Americans) have at best only modest interest in politics.96 
To focus our hypotheses reflecting these influences, we predicted 
that reactions to the Scott tape would vary across subjects divided into 
two prominent and recognizable cultural styles, which we designated 
“aleph” and “bet.”  Alephs hold conspicuously hierarchical and indi-
vidualistic cultural worldviews and (on most questions, at least) highly 
conservative political leanings.  Demographically, they are more likely 
to be affluent white males.97  Alephs also are more likely to live in the 
South or far West, where hierarchical and individualistic values pre-
dominate.98  Bets, in contrast, hold disproportionately egalitarian and 
communitarian views.  Their politics are more liberal and Democratic.  
Relative to alephs, at least, bets will also be disproportionately female 
and African American.  And they are more likely to live in the North-
east, where egalitarian and communitarian cultural worldviews are 
relatively predominant.99 
We understand these groups to be recognizable contemporary ex-
amples of what Gusfield refers to as “status collectivities.”100  “Unlike 
groups such as religious and ethnic communities[,] they have no 
church, no political unit, and no associational units which explicitly 
defend their interests,” but are nevertheless affiliated, in their own self-
understandings and in the views of others, by largely convergent 
worldviews and by common commitments to salient political agen-
das.101  “They possess subcultures” that play a conspicuous role in po-
litical conflict motivated by symbolic status competition.102  The issues 
that pit our aleph and bet styles against each other range from affirma-
tive action to gun control, from nuclear power to abortion, from the 
death penalty to gay rights.103 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 96 See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences By Constructing Institutions: A Cultural The-
ory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3, 15–18 (1987); see also Kahan et al., Risk 
and Culture Study, supra note 62, at 14–15. 
 97 Indeed, a discrete but sizable subset of white males who hold extremely hierarchical and 
individualistic values drive the so-called “white male effect,” which refers to the disposition of 
white men to attribute less risk to various putatively dangerous activities than do women and mi-
norities.  See generally Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59. 
 98 See generally RAYMOND D. GASTIL, CULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1975) (providing basic cultural descriptions of geographic regions); NISBETT & COHEN, supra 
note 95 (contrasting the South with the North, West, and Midwest). 
 99 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
439–42, 452–53, 462–67 (1999) (describing culturally grounded status conflict between these types 
on issues such as the death penalty, gun control, and hate crimes). 
 100 GUSFIELD, supra note 17, at  21 (emphasis omitted). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See, e.g., id. at 140–41, 167–71; KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD 158–91 (1984); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 
(1997) (gay rights and affirmative action); Kahan, supra note 99 (gun control and death penalty).  
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As the Court’s analysis in Scott illustrates, someone called upon to 
evaluate a high-speed car chase must individuate and compare com-
peting risks.  Which course of action by the police creates greater risk 
for the public — pursuing a driver who refuses to stop or letting him 
(and others in his situation) go?  What sorts of risk are worse — the 
continuous but indeterminately lethal ones to the public and the police 
associated with maintaining pursuit of a fleeing driver, or the sudden 
and more obviously lethal one to the driver associated with deliber-
ately inducing his car to crash to a halt?  Aleph and bet subjects, we 
surmised, would form competing perceptions and evaluations relating 
to these matters. 
Aleph subjects, we hypothesized, would assess the risks in a man-
ner consistent with that of the Scott majority.  Alephs morally disap-
prove of challenges to lawful authority and defiance of dominant 
norms.  These moral sensibilities make it congenial for them to believe, 
among other things, that illicit drug trafficking causes social harm and 
that excessive gun control renders law-abiding citizens vulnerable to 
predation.104  The same cultural and political sensibilities would likely 
trigger negative emotions, including fear of and resentment toward 
Harris as a symbol of deviance and law-breaking.  People who hold 
individualistic and hierarchic worldviews and associated political com-
mitments also tend to approve of highly punitive responses to law-
breaking, and as a result, to believe that such measures (including 
capital punishment) reduce the incidence of dangerous or harmful be-
havior.105  This shared disposition, we surmised, would move subjects 
to approve of both the decision to pursue Harris at the outset and the 
decision to use deadly force to terminate the chase as risk-reducing on 
balance. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Like any scheme that purports to treat “culture” as an explanatory variable — particularly one 
amenable to measurement — ours necessarily reflects a highly simplified account of how shared 
values, experiences, and patterns of living connect people.  Indeed, in referring to aleph and bet as 
cultural styles, we mean to emphasize the relatively modest depth of the affinities that connect 
individuals who adhere to them.  As is clearly implied in Gusfield’s account of status collectiv-
ities, aleph and bet comprise subgroups whose members, by virtue of more intimate ties, obviously 
possess distinct “cultures” in an even deeper sense.  We recognize, too, that there will be some is-
sues that divide the subcommunities that tend to share either the aleph or bet styles.  See, e.g., 
Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 494–95 (discussing variation among 
white and African American egalitarians on issues involving sexual mores).  Because the aleph 
and bet styles are salient and do figure in a familiar range of political conflicts, we see utility, both 
methodological and practical, in incorporating them into our analysis.  But we most certainly do 
not mean, in adopting this scheme, to make the patently absurd claim that American society con-
sists of just two “cultures” or “cultural types.” 
 104 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 156–57 (2006) (describing theory of cultural cognition); see also Kahan, supra 
note 19, at 131–36.  
 105 Cf. Kahan, supra note 19, at 122–23. 
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We hypothesized that bet subjects would form the opposite set of 
reactions.  Their egalitarian worldviews and left-leaning political sen-
sibilities can be expected to incline bets to condemn authority figures 
for abuses of power much more readily than they condemn putative 
deviants for defying authority.106  Reinforced by their communitarian 
orientation, these same dispositions tend to make bet persons suppor-
tive of social welfare programs.107  Adopting factual beliefs congenial 
to these dispositions, such individuals tend to think that capital pun-
ishment and other punitive measures are not effective deterrents, and 
that permitting individuals to arm themselves with guns for self-
protection, rather than making society safer, increases the risk of crime 
and accidents.108  In the same vein, we predicted that individuals who 
adhere to the bet style, when they viewed the Scott tape, would be an-
grier at the police, as symbols of overreaching authority figures indif-
ferent to the danger their use of coercion posed to the well-being of by-
standers, not to mention Harris.  As a result, they would form the 
judgment that the decisions to chase Harris and to use deadly force to 
halt his flight did not reduce the net risk to society. 
D.  Results 
We present the results of our study in two steps.  First, we offer 
preliminary analyses of the reactions of our subjects, overall and 
across different groups, to the Scott tape.  Second, we use statistical 
simulations to explore more systematically how individuals bearing 
combinations of characteristics that endow them with identities consis-
tent with the aleph and bet cultural styles would view the facts the 
tape reveals. 
1.  Preliminary Analyses: Main Effects and Group Differences. — A 
preliminary examination of the data reveals two conclusions.  The first 
is that a relatively large majority formed perceptions of the Scott tape 
consistent with that of the Supreme Court majority.  The second is 
that there are nevertheless marked differences in perceptions across 
identifiable subgroups.109 
As reflected in Figure 2 and Figure 3, overall perceptions of the key 
risk issues are highly consistent with those of the Court in Scott.  Solid 
majorities agreed either “strongly” or “moderately” that Harris’s driv-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 106 See sources cited supra note 66.  
 107 See Kahan et al., Risk and Culture Study, supra note 62, at 15. 
 108 See Kahan, supra note 19, at 134–36. 
 109 To correct for underrepresentation of African Americans in the sample — and thus make 
the results more reflective of the likely views of the American public at large — the sample-wide 
summary statistics reported in Figure 2 through Figure 4 use population-weighted data. The 
group summary statistics reported in Table 1 use unweighted data, as do the multivariate regres-
sion analyses reflected in Table 2 and the statistical simulations presented infra section II.D.2. 
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ing posed a deadly risk to the public, and additional subjects “slightly” 
agreed with those statements.  The subjects were more equivocal 
about the decision of the police to pursue Harris; 45% agreed (28% ei-
ther “strongly” or “moderately”) that the chase was not worth the risk 
it posed to the public, and another 13% only “slightly” agreed that the 
chase was worth the risk.  Still, 74% of the subjects judged Harris to 
be either “much more” or “slightly more” at fault for the risk to the 
public.110 
 
Figure 2.  Overall Perceptions of Risk 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 110 All percentages reported in the Figures and Tables and discussed in the text are rounded to 
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Figure 3.  Overall Perceptions of Fault 
 
On the ultimate question (Figure 4), approximately 75% agreed and 
26% disagreed that the use of deadly force was warranted.  Reflecting 
some equivocation, however, nearly a quarter agreed or disagreed only 
slightly. 
 
Figure 4.  Deadly Force Was Justified  








































2009] WHOSE EYES ARE YOU GOING TO BELIEVE? 867 
 Table 1 illustrates the mass of individual variation tucked into the 
main effects illustrated in Figures 2 through 4.  That table reports 
group means on the individual response items and on the composite 
“Agree with Court” scale, which reflects the average of the response to 
all of the items.111  As predicted, African Americans took a signifi-
cantly more pro-plaintiff stance across all items.  So did Democrats 
relative to Republicans, liberals relative to conservatives, and Egali-
tarians relative to Hierarchs.  Communitarians were significantly more 
pro-plaintiff than Individualists for every item except risk to the pub-
lic.  Women were also generally more pro-plaintiff, although statisti-
cally the difference between the sexes was only marginally significant 
(p = 0.07 for “Agree with Court”; p = 0.09 for “Deadly Force Justified”). 
Table 1 also reveals some additional sources of variation.  Lower-
income subjects were consistently more pro-plaintiff than were higher 
income ones.  Nevertheless, less educated subjects were overall more 
pro-defendant than were more educated subjects.  So, unexpectedly, 
were married subjects. 
Older subjects were more inclined than younger ones to view the 
chase as not worth the risk it imposed on the public and the use of 
deadly force as not justified by the risk Harris posed.  However, con-
trary to Justice Stevens’s hypothesis, elderly subjects did not perceive 
Harris’s driving to be less risky to either the public or the police. 
One might have surmised that urban dwellers would react differ-
ently from non-urban ones.  But our results detected no such effect. 
The impact of various individual characteristics relative to each 
other is reflected in the ordered logistic regression analyses reported in 
Table 2.  A multivariate regression model shows how much variance in 
any explanatory or “independent” variable (here race, gender, cultural 
worldview, and so forth) affects a quantity of interest (in our case, sub-
jects’ answers to our response measures) when the impact of every 
other independent variable in the model is held constant.112  The mod-
els in Table 2 demonstrate that being African American (as opposed to 
white) exerts the largest effect across the various response measures.  
How hierarchical or egalitarian subjects’ worldviews are also exerts a 
relatively large (and statistically significant) independent effect across 
all measures except the perceived risk of Harris’s driving to the public.  
Being from the Northeast likewise had a relatively large (and statisti-
cally significant) effect across all but two of the measures.  Income had 
a significant but relatively small effect on three of the five measures as 
well. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 See supra p. 858. 
 112 See JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALY-
SIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 6–7 (3d ed. 2003). 
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Table 1.  Mean Responses 












Scale 1–6 1 (police) to
5 (Harris) 
 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree)  
Female 4.37 4.18 3.25 4.92 4.61 4.37 
Male 4.48 4.28 3.09 5.04 4.64 4.52 
Difference 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.15 
Black 3.70 3.57 3.87 4.42 3.83 3.51 
White 4.50 4.32 3.04 5.03 4.69 4.55 
Difference 0.80 0.75 0.83 0.61 0.86 1.04 
< $35,000/yr 4.23 4.05 3.35 4.66 4.53 4.25 
≥ $50,000/yr 4.52 4.30 3.09 5.15 4.69 4.54 
Difference 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.16 0.29 
≤ HS degree 4.50 4.30 3.17 5.02 4.75 4.61 
≥ BA degree 4.24 4.07 3.33 4.89 4.44 4.10 
Difference 0.26 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.31 0.51 
18-36 yrs old 4.44 4.19 2.96 4.89 4.57 4.50 
> 53 yrs old 4.28 4.17 3.46 4.84 4.58 4.28 
Difference 0.16 0.02 0.50 0.05 0.01 0.22 
Unmarried 4.24 4.10 3.28 4.72 4.47 4.22 
Married 4.58 4.34 3.08 5.20 4.77 4.64 
Difference 0.34 0.24 0.20 0.48 0.30 0.42 
Urban 4.44 4.23 3.02 4.92 4.61 4.48 
Nonurban 4.41 4.23 3.20 4.99 4.63 4.44 
Difference 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.04 
Northeast 4.23 4.13 3.37 4.78 4.40 4.20 
South or West 4.51 4.28 3.04 5.02 4.72 4.58 
Difference 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.24 0.32 0.38 
Democrats 4.16 4.00 3.55 4.85 4.44 4.07 
Republicans 4.72 4.51 2.70 5.14 4.84 4.82 
Difference 0.56 0.51 0.85 0.29 0.40 0.75 
Liberals 4.13 4.01 3.45 4.74 4.35 4.01 
Conservatives 4.67 4.44 2.87 5.15 4.85 4.80 
Difference 0.54 0.43 0.58 0.41 0.50 0.79 
Egalitarians 4.21 4.05 3.52 4.90 4.51 4.14 
Hierarchs 4.62 4.40 2.84 5.05 4.74 4.73 
Difference 0.41 0.35 0.68 0.15 0.23 0.59 
Communitarians 4.28 4.09 3.38 4.94 4.52 4.23 
Individualists 4.56 4.37 2.96 5.02 4.74 4.65 
Difference 0.28 0.28 0.42 0.08 0.22 0.42 
Bolded text indicates difference in means of paired groups significant at p ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 2.  Ordered Logistic Regression Models  




























































































































































































































R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.11 
log likelihood -2296.53 -1731.62 -2049.71 -1393.15 -2060.64 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N = 1,347.  Dependent variables are responses to the indicated survey items.  Coefficients are 
ordered log-odds (ordered logits).  Bolded coefficients are significant at p ≤ 0.05.  Parentheti-
cals indicate standard errors. 
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 Some characteristics of interest had no significant effect in the re-
gression models.  These included gender (p = 0.15, for “Force Justi-
fied,” for example) and the relative individualistic or communitarian 
worldview of subjects (p = 0.45, for “Force Justified”), although those 
variables did have the expected signs.  This finding, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that these characteristics in fact have no influence on 
perceptions of the Scott tape.  They mean only that these characteris-
tics do not have an influence considered apart from whatever effect 
they might be exerting jointly with other characteristics.113 
This picture is largely consistent with our hypotheses.  But it re-
mains blurry.  Differences in means show that characteristics like race, 
gender, income, party affiliation, ideology, region of residence, and cul-
tural orientation all tend to matter.  But in the real world, people’s 
identities are usually not formed with reference only to one or another 
of these characteristics but with reference to packages of them that co-
here with and reinforce one another in meaningful ways.  Far from 
eliminating this problem, multivariate regression analysis exaggerates 
it by partialing out the joint effects of these characteristics and show-
ing us only what each independently contributes, thus obscuring the 
effects they will exert in tandem if they covary.114  Our aleph and bet 
cultural styles form packages of related, and typically jointly occur-
ring, characteristics and dispositions.  Clarifying the picture of what 
individuals holding these recognizable combinations of these character-
istics are seeing in the Scott tape, then, requires a more powerful form 
of statistical analysis. 
2.  Clarifying the Data: Statistical Simulations. — (a)  Overview. 
— Clarify, a statistical application designed by Harvard political scien-
tist Gary King, makes such analysis possible.  In conventional regres-
sion analysis, the influence of some set of explanatory variables on a 
dependent variable is expressed in a mathematical equation, the ele-
ments of which (regression coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and 
so forth) are reported in a table (such as our Table 2).115  Clarify is in-
tended to generate data analyses that simultaneously extract more in-
formation from a multivariate regression and present it more intelligi-
bly.116  Using Clarify, an analyst specifies values for the independent 
variables that form a regression model.  The application then gener-
ates a predicted value for the dependent variable through a statistical 
simulation that takes account of the model’s key parameters (including 
the standard errors for the regression coefficients).  It then repeats that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 See id. at 79. 
 114 See id. at 72, 78–79. 
 115 See generally id. 
 116 See Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000). 
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process.  Then it repeats it again.  Then it repeats it again and again 
and again — as many times as directed by the analyst (typically 1000 
times, or enough to approximate the entire probability distribution for 
the dependent variable).  The resulting array of values for the depend-
ent variable can then be analyzed with techniques that are statistically 
equivalent to those used in survey sampling to determine an average 
predicted value, plus a precisely calculated margin of error.117 
This form of analysis has various advantages over conventional re-
gression analysis.  Conventional regression outputs (such as those re-
flected in Table 2) report the impact and statistical significance of each 
predictor or independent variable while controlling for the impact of 
every other one.118  As such, these outputs obscure the impact of theo-
retically relevant combinations of predictors (in our study, the various 
characteristics associated with the aleph and bet cultural styles).  That 
impact can easily be modeled through Clarify simulations, which per-
mit one to compare how competing sets of predictors jointly affect a 
quantity of interest (such as responses to our various risk-perception 
measures).119  In addition, consistent with the growing movement in 
the social sciences to make statistical analysis more accessible,120 the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 See id. at 349–51. 
 118 The concept of statistical significance is used to characterize a degree of confidence, as re-
flected in a p-value, that a predictor or independent variable (e.g., length of imprisonment) exerts 
an effect on a quantity of interest or dependent variable (e.g., the crime rate).  The p-value repre-
sents the probability that the difference between any observed effect and zero (or no effect) could 
have occurred by chance.  Conventionally, an effect is considered statistically significant when p ≤ 
.05, meaning that the likelihood that one might have observed the measured effect when the pre-
dictor in fact has no effect is less than 5%.  See generally Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (P < 
.05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997 (1994).  Accordingly, the “nonsignficant” 0.15 p-value for Fe-
male in “Force Justified” indicates that there is a 15% chance that the observed effect of being 
female (controlling for all other influences) in reducing support for a pro-defendant outcome oc-
curred by chance. 
 119 Independent-variable regression coefficients that are not statistically significant considered 
in isolation can still have a significant joint effect on the dependent variable when added together.  
To capture that effect, nonsignificant predictors can be included, and set to whatever value is de-
sired by the analyst, in a Clarify simulation.  See Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, 
Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, Jan. 
2003, at 1, 19 (2003).  “This is not problematic because the true quantities of interest are usually 
the predicted values, . . . not the coefficients themselves.”  Id.  The size of the standard error asso-
ciated with any predictor (i.e., independent variable) included in the simulation will, of course, 
affect the precision of the predicted value of the quantity of interest (i.e., the dependent variable).  
But because “even coefficients that are not statistically significant can provide important informa-
tion,” it is more sensible “to focus on the confidence intervals Clarify reports for each quantity it 
computes than the standard errors of coefficients.”  Id.; see also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNI-
FER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MOD-
ELS 42, 69 (2007) (rejecting the position that statistically nonsignificant independent variables 
should be excluded from predictive models and identifying circumstances in which their inclusion 
“make[s] sense,” id. at 42). 
 120 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, Cristian Pasarica & Rahul Dodhia, Let’s Practice What We 
Preach: Turning Tables into Graphs, 56 AM. STATISTICIAN 121 (2002).  In the legal academy, Lee 
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results of Clarify simulations — predicted values for quantities of in-
terest, subject to specified margins of error — can be graphically dis-
played in a manner that more clearly illustrates their real-world sig-
nificance to real-world people than do regression coefficients, which 
lack intuitive meaning.121 
This form of analysis furnishes a perfect fit for our purposes.  We 
are interested in the perceptions of subcommunities of people holding 
combinations of characteristics associated with the cultural styles  
that we have designated aleph and bet.  We can form reasonable statis-
tical predictions of those perceptions by setting pertinent characteris-
tics — gender, race, region of residence, political ideology, party affilia-
tion, and cultural worldviews — to appropriate values in Clarify 
simulations. 
(b)  Ron, Linda, Bernie, and Pat. — We used Clarify to simulate 
the responses of our four hypothetical jurors, Ron, Linda, Bernie, and 
Pat.  Ron was endowed with characteristics associated with the aleph 
cultural style.  He is a white male.  He is significantly more hierarchic 
and more individualistic (in the top quartile of the population for both 
characteristics) than the average American.  He is a Republican and 
also extremely conservative.  He is fairly well-educated (a professional 
degree), and his household income is relatively high (over $175,000 per 
year).  He is from Arizona, or some other “Far West” state.  He is 46 
years old (the population mean, excluding those under 18).  Having no 
reason to believe that alephs differ from bets in their family status, we 
treated him as being as likely to be married and have children as the 
average American.122 
We set Linda’s characteristics to those of a recognizable bet.  She is 
an African-American female.  She is a liberal Democrat.  She lives in 
Pennsylvania, or another Northeastern state.  She is significantly more 
egalitarian and more communitarian in her cultural outlooks than the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Epstein and her coauthors have forcefully espoused the use of simulations and other forms of 
analysis that make the practical impact of multivariate regressions more accessible.  See Lee Ep-
stein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Re-
sults of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811 (2006); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin 
& Christina L. Boyd, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part 
II, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
 121 See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 116, at 347 (explaining that Monte Carlo statisti-
cal simulations used in Clarify “extract . . . currently overlooked information” that “(1) convey[s] 
numerically precise estimates of the quantities of greatest substantive interest, (2) include[s] rea-
sonable assessments of uncertainty about those estimates, and (3) require[s] little specialized 
knowledge to understand”); id. at 360. 
 122 As can be seen in Table 2, being married and having children tend to predict greater agree-
ment with the Court majority.  Simulations suggest that, all else being equal, being married with 
children, as opposed to unmarried and childless, predicts about a 5% (± 1%) increase in the likeli-
hood of agreement with the Court’s disposition on the “ultimate issue” — whether deadly force 
was justified in light of the risk that Harris posed. 
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population mean (in the top quartile for both).  She has an associate’s 
degree (or more precisely, some college education short of a bachelor’s 
degree) and makes a modest salary (around $25,000 per year) as an oc-
cupational therapist’s assistant.  We made no assumptions about her 
marital or family status. 
Bernie also fits the profile for a bet.  As a white male, his inclusion 
in the analysis helps to show how that particular cultural style is not 
confined to African Americans or women.  Because white bets tend to 
be more egalitarian in their attitudes toward sexual mores than do Af-
rican American ones,123 we assigned Bernie a more egalitarian world-
view (in the top decile of the population) than Linda.  He is coded as a 
liberal Democrat.  As one would expect of a university professor, he is 
extremely well educated (he holds a doctorate degree), but makes a 
more modest salary (that of the population mean).  Like Linda, he 
lives in the Northeast.  In other respects (including marital status and 
parenthood), his characteristics were set to the population mean. 
Pat, of course, is an “average American.”  All of his/her values (in-
cluding gender) have been set to the American population mean.  Nei-
ther aleph nor bet (or perhaps a bit of both), he/she is included as a 
heuristic benchmark for assessing the views of the other representative 
members of our hypothetical venire. 
Using Clarify, we simulated the responses of Ron, Bernie, Linda, 
and Pat to the statements used to assess subjects’ perceptions of the 
Scott tape.  The results appear in Figures 5 to 9 and Tables 3 to 7.124  
In the cases of Ron, Linda, and Bernie, the percentages can be inter-
preted as reflecting either the likelihood that a person with his or her 
characteristics would respond to an item in the indicated manner or 
the percentage of people with his or her characteristics who would re-
spond that way.  For Pat, the percentages can be understood to reflect 
either the likelihood that any person picked from the American popu-
lation would respond as indicated or the percentage of persons in the 
general population who would so respond. 
Figure 5 and Table 3 furnish a vivid image of the deep dissensus 
that exists over whether the police should have engaged in a high-
speed chase to apprehend Scott in the first place.  For Ron, this is a 
no-brainer: approximately three-quarters (76%, ± 2%) of the persons 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 123 See Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wilcox, Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward 
Abortion: A Review and Research Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 492 (2003) (finding that African 
Americans are more opposed to abortion than are whites); Gregory B. Lewis, Black-White Differ-
ences in Attitudes Toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 59, 63 (2003) 
(reviewing studies finding African Americans more opposed to homosexuality than whites control-
ling for other influences); see also Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 59, at 494–
95 (finding that egalitarianism influences abortion risk perceptions less powerfully among African 
Americans than among whites). 
 124 The margins of error for all estimates reflect a 95% level of confidence. 
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who share his defining characteristics disagree — about two-thirds 
(66%, ± 3%) either moderately or strongly — with the proposition that 
the chase “wasn’t worth the danger to the public.”  Bernie and Linda, 
in contrast, generally agree with that same statement: 59% (± 3%) of 
the persons who share Linda’s characteristics either strongly or mod-
erately agree the chase wasn’t worth the risk, and another consider-
able slice (18%, ± 4%) “slightly agree”; 73% (± 3%) of the persons who 
share Bernie’s characteristics agree (about half moderately or strongly) 
that the chase wasn’t worth it.  Pat leans toward Ron but is equivocal: 
55% (± 2%) of the members of the general population (according to the 
simulation) reject the claim that the chase wasn’t worth the risk to the 
public, but the median citizen is only “slightly” inclined toward that 
position. 
 
Figure 5.  Chase Not Worth the Risk 
 
Table 3.  Chase Not Worth the Risk 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 5% ( ± 2%) 11% ( ± 2%) 31% ( ± 9%) 36% ( ± 12%) 
Moderately Agree 7% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 2%) 22% ( ± 4%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
Slightly Agree 12% ( ± 3%) 19% ( ± 2%) 20% ( ± 3%) 18% ( ± 4%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 10% ( ± 2%) 12% ( ± 2%) 9% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 3%) 
Moderately Disagree 21% ( ± 3%) 19% ( ± 2%) 10% ( ± 3%) 8% ( ± 4%) 
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Figure 6 and Figure 7, along with Table 4 and Table 5, address the 
risk that Harris’s driving posed.  Much like the majority in Scott, 
Americans on average (represented by Pat) are strongly disposed to see 
Harris as a lethal menace: over 85% believe (more than 70% either 
moderately or strongly) that he posed a risk to the public, and about 
80% believe (over 60% either moderately or strongly) that he posed a 
deadly risk to the police.  People who see the world the way Ron does 
hold these beliefs even more decidedly. 
Bernie and Linda believe Harris’s driving posed deadly risks too, 
but their views are somewhat more equivocal.  Fewer than one-half 
(44%, ± 4%) of the persons who share Linda’s defining characteristics 
believe either moderately or strongly that Harris posed a lethal danger 
to the public, and another quarter (23%, ± 3%) of those persons agree 
only “slightly” with that proposition.  Even fewer (37%, ± 5%) of the 
Lindas in American society hold a firm conviction (“moderately” or 
“strongly agree”) that Harris posed a lethal danger to the police.  
Fewer than half of the persons with Bernie’s characteristics (39%, ± 
4%) would have a firm conviction (“moderately” or “strongly agree”) 
that Harris put the police at deadly risk.  There is a high likelihood 
(75%, ± 4%) that someone with his characteristics will agree that Har-
ris’s escapade posed a lethal threat to the public, although only about 
half (54%, ± 3%) would agree either “moderately” or “strongly.” 
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Table 4.  Harris a Lethal Danger to the Public 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 67% ( ± 11%) 53% ( ± 3%) 30% ( ± 10%) 23% ( ± 10%) 
Moderately Agree 17% ( ± 5%) 22% ( ± 2%) 24% ( ± 3%) 21% ( ± 4%) 
Slightly Agree 9% ( ± 3%) 13% ( ± 2%) 21% ( ± 4%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 2% ( ± 1%) 4% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 3%) 9% ( ± 3%) 
Moderately Disagree 3% ( ± 1%) 5% ( ± 1%) 10% ( ± 4%) 14% ( ± 5%) 
Strongly Disagree 2% ( ± 1%) 3% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 4%) 10% ( ± 6%) 
 
Figure 7.  Harris a Lethal Danger to Police 
 
Table 5.  Harris a Lethal Danger to Police 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 46% ( ± 11%) 37% ( ± 3%) 18% ( ± 7%) 17% ( ± 7%) 
Moderately Agree 25% ( ± 3%) 26% ( ± 2%) 21% ( ± 4%) 20% ( ± 5%) 
Slightly Agree 15% ( ± 4%) 18% ( ± 2%) 23% ( ± 3%) 23% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 6% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 1%) 15% ( ± 3%) 15% ( ± 4%) 
Moderately Disagree 5% ( ± 2%) 6% ( ± 1%) 13% ( ± 5%) 14% ( ± 5%) 
Strongly Disagree 3% ( ± 1%) 4% ( ± 1%) 11% ( ± 5%) 12% ( ± 6%) 
  
The simulations also furnish a clear picture of the divisions hidden 
within the societal consensus over the “relative culpability” of Harris 
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the persons who hold Ron’s defining attributes feel Harris was either 
“much more” (88%, ± 6%) or “slightly more” (6%, ± 2%) at fault.  Pat, 
representing the average American, is almost as emphatic in his/her 
condemnation: there is a 79% (± 2%) chance, the simulation suggests, 
that a member of the general public will see Harris as more at fault, 
and only a 5% (± 1 %) chance that he/she will regard the police as 
more culpable.  
 
Figure 8.  Relative Culpability 
 
Table 6.  Relative Culpability 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Harris Much More at Fault 88% ( ± 6%) 64% ( ± 3%) 29% ( ± 11%) 16% ( ± 8%) 
Harris Slightly More at Fault 6% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 2%) 18% ( ± 3%) 13% ( ± 4%) 
Equally at Fault 5% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 2%) 32% ( ± 5%) 35% ( ± 5%) 
Police Slightly More at Fault 1% ( ± < 1%) 2% ( ± 1%) 8% ( ± 4%) 12% ( ± 4%) 
Police Much More at Fault 1% ( ± < 1%) 3% ( ± 1%) 13% ( ± 6%) 24% ( ± 11%) 
 
Bernie and Linda, though, see matters differently.  About one-half 
(53%, ± 5%) of the people who share Bernie’s defining characteristics 
will say either that the parties were equally at fault or the police more 
at fault.  At most a third (29%, ± 4%) of the persons who share 
Linda’s characteristics will say that Harris was more at fault; a person 
who shares her characteristics is at least five times more likely (36%, ± 
4%) to say that the police were more at fault than is an average mem-
ber of the general population (5%, ± 1%). 
Bernie and Linda also don’t agree with the Scott majority on the 
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the persons who share Linda’s characteristics disagree — about one-
half either strongly or moderately — with the statement that “[t]he 
danger that Harris’s driving posed to the police and the public justi-
fied Officer Scott’s decision to end the chase in a way that put Harris’s 
own life in danger.”  Nearly three-fifths (58%, ± 2%) of the persons 
who hold Bernie’s characteristics are also likely to believe that deadly 
force was unreasonable. 
 
Figure 9.  Deadly Force Termination Justified 
 
Table 7.  Deadly Force Termination Justified 
 Ron Pat Bernie Linda  
Strongly Agree 55% ( ± 11%) 37% ( ± 3%) 11% ( ± 5%) 9% ( ± 4%) 
Moderately Agree 23% ( ± 4%) 27% ( ± 2%) 16% ( ± 5%) 13% ( ± 5%) 
Slightly Agree 9% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 2%) 15% ( ± 3%) 14% ( ± 3%) 
 
Slightly Disagree 4% ( ± 2%) 7% ( ± 1%) 12% ( ± 2%) 11% ( ± 2%) 
Moderately Disagree 4% ( ± 2%) 8% ( ± 1%) 20% ( ± 4%) 21% ( ± 4%) 
Strongly Disagree 4% ( ± 1%) 7% ( ± 1%) 26% ( ± 9%) 33% ( ± 11%) 
  
 Pat does agree with the Scott majority, although not without a bit 
of equivocation.  There is a 64% (± 2%) chance that a person drawn 
randomly from the population would either moderately or strongly 
agree that the police were justified in using deadly force.  There is, 
however, a 14% (± 2%) chance that he/she would be only “slightly” in-
clined to agree, and over a 20% chance that he/she would conclude 
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Ron again is emphatic.  Over 80% of the individuals who share his 
characteristics would find the police acted reasonably. 
E.  Summary and Discussion 
The results of our study strongly confirmed our hypotheses.  With 
the exception of whether the police should have initiated a high-speed 
chase — a matter on which subjects sharply disagreed — reactions to 
the Scott tape reflect constrained dissensus.  A very sizable majority of 
our diverse, nationally representative sample agreed with the Scott 
majority that Harris’s driving exposed the public and the police to le-
thal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the police for putting the 
public in danger, and that deadly force ultimately was reasonable to 
terminate the chase.  However, dissent from these perceptions and 
evaluations was not random; the minority of subjects who disagreed 
about the appropriateness of deadly force were connected by a core of 
identity-defining characteristics.  Indeed, so too were members of a 
minority who formed a view of the facts most unequivocally in line 
with those of the Scott majority. 
The relationship between these perceptions, on the one hand, and 
the relevant group identities, on the other, fits our hypothesis that reac-
tions to the Scott tape would be shaped by various sources of value-
motivated cognition.  As we predicted, there were sharp differences of 
perception among persons bearing characteristics and commitments 
typical of two recognizable cultural styles.  Individuals (particularly 
white males) who hold hierarchical and individualist cultural world-
views, who are politically conservative, who are affluent, and who re-
side in the West were likely to form significantly more pro-defendant 
risk perceptions.  Individuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian 
views, whose politics are liberal, who are well educated but likely less 
affluent, and whose ranks include disproportionately more African 
Americans and women, in contrast, were significantly more likely to 
form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion that the police 
acted reasonably in using deadly force to terminate the chase.  The 
conspicuous competition between these recognizable cultural styles (or 
“status collectivities”125) on issues ranging from gun control to climate 
change, from abortion to the death penalty, attests to the power of the 
images reflected in the Scott tape to provoke perceptions protective of 
observers’ identities.126 
The results of the study also make clear that this form of identity-
protective cognition operates unevenly across the types of risk percep-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 GUSFIELD, supra note 17, at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
 126 See supra p. 862 & note 103 (describing relationship between cultural styles and deeper 
forms of cultural affinity).  
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tions and evaluations that the Court’s own analysis in Scott reflects.  
Persons subscribing to the bet cultural style disagreed with those sub-
scribing to the aleph style about the risk posed by Harris’s driving, but 
they even more strongly disagreed about the apportionment of fault 
between Harris and the police for creating that risk.  The latter as-
sessment, likely combined with a similar discrepancy between these 
groups on whether the chase was worth the risk to the public to begin 
with, is apparently what explains the disagreement over whether 
deadly force was justified.  The stake that those adhering to these 
styles have in protecting their respective identities, then, impels them 
into disagreement most strongly on whether the behavior of the police 
was risk-reducing or risk-enhancing on net, likely because that “fact” 
has the closest connection to whether we should view those in author-
ity with trust or suspicion. 
As we have discussed, the Court’s opinion admits of some ambigu-
ity on exactly which issues the video was deemed dispositive.127  Were 
a case like Scott to be submitted to a jury, of course, the jury would be 
called upon to decide (in the form of a general verdict) all the issues 
that the Court identified as decisive to its analysis.  That is, in consid-
ering whether the use of deadly force to terminate the chase was rea-
sonable, the jury would be required not only to gauge the degree of 
risk that the fleeing driver’s behavior imposed on the public and the 
police, but also to assess the “relative culpability” of the fleeing driver 
and the pursuing police officer for creating that risk.128 
As a result of the Court’s decision in Scott, though, in no case will 
a jury be permitted to decide any of those issues.  The Court’s decision 
effectively determined that, regardless of whatever other evidence 
might be presented in the case and whatever might transpire in the 
course of jury deliberations, there could be no room for “reasonable” 
disagreement on either the magnitude of the risks involved in the case 
or the role of the police in reducing or exacerbating those risks. 
Our analysis suggests that this conclusion cannot be based on the 
ground that in fact no identifiable group of people would disagree with 
the Court on these matters after watching the Scott tape.  The Court’s 
decision can be justified only if the members of that group — those 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 See supra pp. 856–57. 
 128 See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 192–93 (2005) (“The third aspect of 
the Plaintiff’s [§ 1983, Fourth Amendment] claim is that excessive force was used by the Defen-
dants in effecting the Plaintiff’s arrest. . . . Whether a specific use of force is excessive or unrea-
sonable turns on factors such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
violent threat to others, and whether the suspect is resisting or fleeing.  You must decide whether 
the force used in making an arrest was excessive or unreasonable on the basis of that degree of 
force that a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would have applied in making the 
arrest under the same circumstances disclosed in this case.”). 
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who do see something different from the Court majority — are neces-
sarily “unreasonable.”  We consider next whether such a conclusion 
can possibly be an appropriate one for the law to make. 
III.  EVALUATING SCOTT 
Just as the Scott tape doesn’t “speak for itself” in a way that gener-
ates a single, indisputably correct answer to the factual issues posed by 
the case, so our study results don’t “speak for themselves” in a way 
that generates a single and indisputably correct answer to whether 
Scott was correctly decided.  Our results show that a substantial ma-
jority of the American public would likely see the key facts in the 
manner the Supreme Court majority did.  One could argue that this 
finding supports the Court’s conclusion that summary judgment was 
warranted.  We would not, because we think the shared values and 
other defining characteristics of the citizens who would see things dif-
ferently make it inappropriate to dismiss their minority perspective as 
“unreasonable.”  But we realize full well that this position demands a 
reasoned defense, which we endeavor to supply in this Part.  We also 
identify alternative grounds on which the Court could have reached 
the same result in Scott without insisting that the videotape supported 
only one “reasonable” view of the facts. 
That insistence, we argue, is the only thing that is manifestly wrong 
about the decision.  The Court’s failure to recognize the culturally par-
tial view of social reality that its conclusion embodies is symptomatic 
of a kind of cognitive bias that is endemic to legal and political deci-
sionmaking and that needlessly magnifies cultural conflict over and 
discontent with the law. 
A.  Dissensus, Deliberation, and Legitimacy 
Our study suggests that a fairly sizable majority of Americans 
would agree after viewing the Scott tape that Harris’s driving created 
lethal risks to the public that warranted the police using deadly force 
to terminate the chase.  Such a finding is a necessary condition for 
concluding that the Court was correct to hold that the case should be 
decided summarily, but is it sufficient to justify that outcome? 
To answer the question requires a theoretical understanding of the 
properties of consensus that justify dispensing with civil jury deci-
sionmaking.129  How large, how intense, and how uniform across 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 129 We mean to address this issue not just as it relates to summary judgment but also to judg-
ment for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as well.  Although variously 
worded under the Federal Rules, compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (standard for summary judgment), 
with FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (standard for judgment as a matter of law), “the inquiry [for all these 
dispositions] is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require sub-
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groups must such agreement be for a court to say there is no point in 
obliging the large majority that sees things one way to deliberate with 
an identifiable minority that sees them differently?  We will offer a 
modest theoretical framework for answering that question — modest 
not necessarily because we have only a modest view of our own ability 
as theorists, but rather because we think nothing more than midlevel 
theorizing is needed to show that the necessary properties of consensus 
were lacking in Scott.130 
Presumably, a judge in a case like Scott should not base her deci-
sion to decide summarily on whether she thinks deliberation would in-
crease the likelihood of a correct verdict enough to justify the cost of a 
jury trial.  The reason is that verdict accuracy at a reasonable cost is 
not the point of jury decisionmaking.  If accuracy were the goal, it 
seems unlikely the law would use ordinary citizens to decide facts in a 
one-off fashion; it would almost certainly rely instead on professionals, 
whose expertise in “getting it right” would reflect both prior training 
and experience from repeated decisionmaking.  Or in other words, the 
law would presumably use judges as factfinders.131  This is not to say 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
mission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); see also 9B CHARLES WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2532 (3d ed. 2008).  Nothing in 
our discussion, however, bears on summary disposition under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) or its state-
law equivalents, which require a case to be dismissed for “failure to state a claim,” a disposition 
that goes to the adequacy of a plaintiff’s legal theory, not the strength of the plaintiff’s factual 
evidence. 
 130 Our theory is modest, too, in the sense that we do not take on the task of justifying the jury 
system.  There is a rich literature on this subject, many contributions to which we draw on in the 
discussion that follows.  The Court in Scott, of course, did not premise its decision on a radical 
repudiation of the jury and its conventional justifications.  Nevertheless, we can easily imagine 
that the Court was motivated to overstate the conclusiveness of the video on the key facts in the 
case by an unstated resistance to jury trials generally.  See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment 
at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1907–14 (1998) (linking evolving Supreme Court summary judg-
ment standards to growing acceptance of limiting access to jury trials); see also John Bronsteen, 
Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007) (noting and criticizing the same 
trend).  But if so, the Court could have achieved the same result, without duplicity and without 
the cost to legitimacy we attribute to its reasoning, if it had based its decision on the grounds we 
discuss in section III.B. 
 131 The case for professionalization of factfinding has a long pedigree and is well developed.  
See, e.g., ERWIN GRISWOLD, 1962–1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REPORT 5–6 (“Why 
should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their 
lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between per-
sons?”), quoted in HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966).  See 
generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 318–31 
(2003) (documenting the historical antagonism between truth-seeking and the growing centrality 
of the jury in an adversary system of adjudication).  Although the comparison presents methodo-
logical challenges, the weight of the evidence seems to suggest that judges generally render more 
accurate verdicts than juries.  See, e.g., Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Ver-
dicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305 (2007) (surveying past studies and using innovative sta-
tistical methods to determine relative error rates of judges and juries based on rates of disagree-
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that a theory of when jury decisionmaking is worth the bother should 
be indifferent to accuracy, but it is to say such a theory must also be 
sensitive to other properties that a jury is uniquely or specially fitted to 
add to a (reasonably) accurate verdict. 
Those qualities are familiar and are reflected in standard accounts 
of the benefits of jury decisionmaking.  One is the simple ordinariness 
of jurors’ perspectives.132  Facts “speak for themselves” only against 
the background of preexisting understandings of social reality that in-
vest those facts with meaning.  Those understandings come from ex-
periences and social influences that vary across groups of persons in 
systematic ways.  In particular, we can expect ordinary citizens to form 
different understandings of social reality from judges or other profes-
sional factfinders precisely because the process of legal and judicial 
professionalization involves experiences and social influences alien to 
the rest of society.133  Maybe those special experiences and influences 
make the judges “smarter” and better equipped to give facts their 
proper meaning.  But since the judgments of fact on which the law 
bases its commands are ones that govern the lives of ordinary citizens, 
the law would face a fairly obvious difficulty if its view of the “facts” 
didn’t take ordinary citizens’ understandings of reality into account. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ment).  Some dispute this conclusion.  See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in 
the Assessment of Legal Decisionmaking, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 726 (1999).  However, the 
most common reply is to demur; the exclusive focus on accuracy fails to account for the myriad 
other political benefits associated with giving ordinary citizens a conspicuous and (arguably) 
meaningful voice in the administration of justice.  See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, 
JUDGING THE JURY 249 (1986) (arguing that the “political functions of the jury” deserve just as 
much consideration as its “fact-finding functions . . . in judging the jury’s role in society”); Arie M. 
Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 959, 983 (2006) (“[T]he jury is not at its core a mechanism for seeking truth; it is a tool for 
injecting democracy into the judicial process . . . .”); see also Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, 
The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Effi-
ciency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988) (presenting experimental evidence that ordinary citi-
zens prefer the jury on grounds of fairness to other modes of adjudication that appear to surpass 
it in accuracy). 
 132 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994) (“[L]ocal knowledge . . . qualifies the ju-
ror[s] to understand the facts of the case and to pass judgment in ways that a stranger . . . could 
not. . . . [T]hey know the conscience of the community and can apply the law in ways that reso-
nate with the community’s moral values and common sense.”). 
 133 See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862) (“[J]urors, from the mode of their selec-
tion, coming from the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant with the practi-
cal affairs of life, are, in my opinion, much better qualified to judge of the sufficiency and ten-
dency of a given provocation, and much more likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy, the 
standard of what constitutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the Judge whose habits 
and course of life give him much less experience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts 
of life.”); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 131, at 248 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of judges are 
still white males who come from a privileged sector of our society.  Often their views of the world 
reflect their backgrounds.  Some rather rigidly adhere to a narrow perspective of justice and fair-
ness that is not consistent with that of the general community.”). 
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That difficulty would be of various forms, all of which relate, es-
sentially, to legitimacy.  “Legitimacy” in a descriptive sense refers to 
the political acceptability of law — its power to command voluntary 
compliance.134  Citizens would be unlikely to assent to legal determina-
tions that seem to reflect inaccurate judgments of fact — inaccurate 
because of their lack of correspondence to ordinary citizens’, as op-
posed to specialized professionals’, understandings of how the world 
works.135 
“Legitimacy” in its normative sense refers to qualities that make the 
law morally worthy of assent.136  Here too the jury plays a critical role.  
Broadly speaking, law has democratic legitimacy when the process of 
its formation is sufficiently connected to (determined by, solicitous of, 
respectful toward) the will of those who are governed by it that we can 
impute the law’s commands to them.137  Jury factfinding is such a 
process: the understanding of the facts reflected in the law can be mor-
ally imputed to those governed by the law when the law uses a fact-
finding process that is informed by their view of social reality. 
Understandings of social reality vary, of course, not only between 
judges and citizens, but also across citizens of diverse experiences and 
social identities.  The diversity of citizens magnifies the contribution 
that jury factfinding makes to legitimacy in all these various senses. 
Just as citizens would be unlikely to assent to verdicts rendered by 
professionals (say, judges) whose understandings of social reality were 
alien to theirs, so diverse citizens would be unlikely to assent to ver-
dicts rendered only by other citizens whose understandings of social 
reality were alien to theirs.138  By affording a factfinding role to citi-
zens from diverse subcommunities, whose understandings of reality re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 134 This is the positive conception of legitimacy associated with the social sciences.  See gener-
ally C.K. Ansell, Legitimacy: Political, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
& BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8704, 8704 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
 135 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 131, at 248–49 (arguing that the public will accept ver-
dicts more readily when rendered by jury than by judge, particularly in a controversial matter); 
cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 1329, 1376 (1971) (modes of adjudication that “fail[] to penetrate or convince the untu-
tored contemporary intuition threaten to make the legal system seem even more alien and inhu-
man than it already does to distressingly many”). 
 136 See Ansell, supra note 134, at 8704 (describing the normative conception of “legitimacy” of 
concern to political philosophers).  
 137 This is the unifying theme of a diverse collection of “social contract” theories of legitimacy.  
See generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS 109–15 (2003). 
 138 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory jury 
selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire 
community.  Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine 
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty  
Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1316–17 (2000) (stressing the role of repre-
sentative juries in dissipating resistance to verdicts likely to be controversial among discrete  
subcommunities). 
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flect experiences and social influences peculiar to those subcommuni-
ties, the jury contributes to the law’s legitimacy in the descriptive 
sense.139  To take an obvious example, the Jim Crow exclusion of Afri-
can Americans from juries140 led to a cynical and dispirited view of le-
gal institutions in minority communities.  Having no voice in that 
mode of the law’s production, those citizens naturally distrusted the 
rules that came from the jury.141 
Likewise, by involving diverse citizens in factfinding, the jury con-
tributes to the law’s democratic legitimacy in the moral sense.  The 
experience of interacting with others whose understandings of social 
reality differ from theirs — and thus learning that their own under-
standings, and hence their views of the facts, are partial — might 
cause jurors of diverse identities to converge on a common view of the 
facts, particularly where one side’s initial view is less intensely held 
than the other’s.142  Such convergence would furnish assurance to the 
diverse citizens whom such jurors represent that the law embodies a 
view of the facts consistent with their shared experiences and defining 
commitments.  This assurance would in turn make the expectation of 
generalized obedience morally compelling. 
But probably even more important, jury deliberation can invest 
law with democratic legitimacy even when factual understandings 
born of diverse experiences and social influence persist.  Necessarily in 
that circumstance, subcommunities whose views of the facts are re-
jected by the law will not be able to see the law as reflecting their un-
derstanding of reality in substance.  Accordingly, they can be expected 
to see the law as theirs in the sense that morally warrants an expecta-
tion of assent only if the law arises from a process that shows due re-
spect for their understanding of reality and hence for their identities.143  
Jury factfinding is a procedural strategy of that sort.  It assures that 
those who win in a contest between competing understandings were 
obliged to listen — under circumstances geared toward maximizing 
the prospects of changes in, and convergences of, perspectives — to 
those who have lost.  And in so doing, it enables the latter to assent 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 139 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (“[T]he proper functioning of the 
jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a ‘body truly representa-
tive of the community,’ and not the organ of any special group or class.” (quoting Smith v. Texas, 
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940))). 
 140 See ABRAMSON, supra note 132, at 108–12. 
 141 See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 
946–47 (2002) (describing civil rights leaders’ resistance to jury trial enforcement of the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act because of distrust of unrepresentative juries). 
 142 See ABRAMSON, supra note 132, at 100–01. 
 143 Cf. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 131, at 51, 248–49 (explaining that subcommunities ag-
grieved by controversial verdicts are more likely to see verdicts as fair if the jury contains their 
members). 
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without the experience of subjugation and domination that estranges 
them from the law.144 
This account brings into sharper focus the features that factual 
consensus must have before it can justify dispensing with jury delib-
eration.  Precisely because juries can lend legitimacy to law by assur-
ing minorities that their perspective is being respected, it surely isn’t 
enough that the facts in a particular case “speak for themselves” for a 
large majority.  If the minority’s view of the facts reflects the minor-
ity’s view of social reality, summary adjudication will deny the minor-
ity a basis to accept, or for the majority to demand that it accept, the 
law’s view of the facts as its own.  Before summary adjudication can 
be justified, then, the consensus that attends a particular set of factual 
findings must be more than (or simply different from) “large.”  It must 
also be devoid of any partial understanding of social reality the en-
dorsement of which by the law would alienate or stigmatize an identi-
fiable subcommunity, whose perspective has been excluded from con-
sideration.  Or, in a word, it must be mundane. 
Most — probably the overwhelming majority — of the cases that 
strike judges as presenting “no genuine issue as to any material fact”145 
will pass this test.  Almost every time a judge declares no such issue to 
exist, whether in a complex commercial dispute or a routine slip-and-
fall suit, she can be confident that some small fraction of potential ju-
rors might well perceive the facts differently; statistical outliers are in-
evitable.  But if these individuals are mere outliers — if they don’t 
share experiences and an identity that endow them with a distinctive 
view of reality, if the factual perceptions in question don’t arise from 
their defining group commitments — summary judgment will not con-
vey the message of exclusion that delegitimizes the law in the eyes of 
identifiable subcommunities. 
Scott, however, was not a case of that sort.  Our data suggest that 
the minority who would see things differently from the Court after 
watching the tape are not idiosyncratic statistical outliers; they are 
members of groups who share a distinctive understanding of social re-
ality that informs their view of the facts.  Those facts, moreover, in-
volve a type of police-citizen encounter fraught with competing conno-
tations in our society: a civil liberties case.  Perhaps the disclosure of 
the experiences and social influences on which the minority’s under-
standing rests could change the majority’s view of social reality, and 
hence its view of the facts. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 144 See generally CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON, ANDRÉ BLAIS, SHAUN BOWLER, TODD 
DONOVAN & OLA LISTHAUG, LOSERS’ CONSENT: ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITI-
MACY (2005). 
 145 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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But even if we assume — as we think is likely — that such expo-
sure would not change the perceptions of the “vast majority,” it still 
does not follow that the Court was right to order that Scott be decided 
summarily.  For it is exactly when the law is certain to endorse a fac-
tual position that aligns it with one contested view of how the world 
works rather than another that the process of jury deliberation per-
forms its greatest function in conserving democratic legitimacy in a di-
verse society.  If the law has not only rejected their view of social real-
ity, but has refused even to permit the articulation of it in the process 
of the law’s determination of the facts, those who disagree lack any re-
sources for understanding the law as theirs.  Indeed, if the law has 
adopted procedures designed rigorously to insulate judicial determina-
tions from the minority’s view of reality because a court deems that 
view to be one no “reasonable” citizen could possibly hold, members of 
that minority cannot understand (or be expected to understand) assent 
as anything other than acquiescence in their status as defeated and 
subjugated outsiders. 
Scott put identifiable subgroups of citizens in exactly that position.  
Even though constrained, the nature of the dissensus surrounding the 
facts revealed in the tape shows that Americans interpret those facts 
against the background of competing subcommunity understandings of 
social reality.  Under these circumstances, ordering that the case be de-
cided summarily based on the video was wrong precisely because do-
ing so denied a dissenting group of citizens the respect they were owed, 
and hence denied the law the legitimacy it needs, when the law adopts 
a view of the facts that divides citizens on social, cultural, and political 
lines.  In so doing, the Scott majority transformed an inevitably partial 
view of social reality reflected in law into a needlessly partisan one. 
B.  How To Defend the Outcome in Scott: Reasons, Not Perceptions 
We have suggested that the Court in Scott was wrong to order 
summary judgment on the ground that it was entitled to “believe its 
own eyes” after watching the tape.  Its decision to privilege its view of 
a set of facts on which even a minority of persons who share a set of 
defining commitments would disagree stigmatizes those citizens as out-
siders and in so doing delegitimizes the law. 
But nothing we have said in that regard implies, necessarily, that 
the result in Scott was incorrect.  We can think of at least three plau-
sible alternative grounds for the decision.  We don’t know whether in 
the end any of them is persuasive (in part because we disagree among 
ourselves about the merits of at least one of them).  But we do believe 
that they all avoid the sort of criticism we have developed of the 
Court’s reasoning — or lack thereof — in the case. 
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One such ground would have emphasized the unique approach that 
courts often take to factfinding in constitutional settings.146  So-called 
“constitutional facts,” unlike those decided in cases presenting no con-
stitutional issue, are often reviewed de novo in the Supreme Court.147  
One reason for independent factfinding is to assure adequate enforce-
ment of constitutional guarantees toward which there is majority an-
tagonism that could seep into jury factfinding.148  Another is the im-
portance of uniformity and predictability in constitutional rules.149  
This concern is particularly compelling where a court can perceive 
that enforcement of a constitutional norm will turn on a type of factual 
perception that a discrete subcommunity does not share, for in that 
case summary adjudication is necessary to avoid inconsistent verdicts 
across jurisdictions and within particular jurisdictions over time.150 
These concerns have had a conspicuous influence in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court has warned against 
“standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of govern-
ment need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted 
into an occasion for constitutional review.”151  To avoid that, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine is replete with rule-like presumptions of reason-
ableness for generically defined fact patterns (for example, the arrest 
and jailing of suspected misdemeanants without regard to their per-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 
247–54 (1985) (history of constitutional fact review). 
 147 Id. at 261–62. 
 148 See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971) (justifying judicial scrutiny 
of jury findings in cases involving the First Amendment because the jury itself is “unlikely to be 
neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument 
for the suppression of those ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks’ which 
must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail,” id. 
at 277 (citation omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
 149 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996) (“[D]e novo review [of facts 
that bear on Fourth Amendment determinations] tends to unify precedent and will come closer to 
providing law enforcement officers with a defined ‘set of rules which, in most instances, makes it 
possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justi-
fied in the interest of law enforcement.’” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981))). 
 150 These, in any case, are the conventional accounts of a certain type of aggressive judicial 
factfinding in constitutional cases.  For an alternative account, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Consti-
tutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1955 (2006).  Goldberg argues that courts tend to disguise contestable normative judg-
ments (sometimes ones that support repression of marginalized groups but also sometimes ones 
that resist such repression) as unassailable “facts” in order to minimize political resistance to their 
decisions.  See id. at 1961; see also Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1048–51 (2005) (book review) (describing tension between empirical and 
normative strands of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence); David L. Faigman, “Normative 
Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544–45 (1991) (identifying normative commitments in factfinding). 
 151 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).  
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ceived dangerousness;152 “suspicionless” interviews of travelers at bus 
terminals;153 the stopping of a vehicle where probable cause exists to 
believe a traffic violation has taken place, without regard to officers’ 
subjective motives for the stop154) that spare police the uncertainty 
that would attend minute, case-specific factual inquiries, whether in 
the context of pretrial motions to exclude evidence from criminal 
prosecutions or of civil actions for damages.155 
The Court in Scott could easily have reversed on the basis of a pre-
sumption of reasonableness defended in this way.  Indeed, its decision 
ended by announcing a “rule” — “[a] police officer’s attempt to termi-
nate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of inno-
cent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it 
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death”156 — that 
going forward could well shield from judicial scrutiny any police chase 
of a fleeing motorist.157 
To be sure, any decision on this basis could have been criticized.  
Every bit as often as the Court has insisted on the importance of 
“bright line” rules, it has also recognized the need for flexible standards 
that can accommodate the fact sensitivity of Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness determinations.158  Because such standards do enlarge the 
role for juries in civil damages cases, this branch of the doctrine is said 
to accord with “[t]he genius of the framers’ [understanding] . . . that 
juries of ordinary Americans can sometimes decide which intrusions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 See id. at 354. 
 153 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 154 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 155 Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 110–11 (2004) (de-
scribing Atwater as a constitutional decision rule). 
 156 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007). 
 157 But see id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I do not read today’s decision as articulating a me-
chanical, per se rule.  The inquiry described by the Court is situation specific.” (citations omitted)); 
id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he video makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of 
this constitutional determination.”).  See generally pp. 856–57 (describing the Scott opinion’s am-
biguity on the rule to be applied in car chase cases and on the identity of the issues subject to de-
termination by the factfinder). 
 158 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme 
Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1417 (2003) (“In addition to the 
Court’s construction of broad, shifting reasonableness propositions, it has also inconsistently char-
acterized the Fourth Amendment as requiring bright-line rules or case-by-case adjudication.”); see 
also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attacking one 
Fourth Amendment “bright line” rule against warrantless search of container during lawful search 
of interior of car: “Our entire profession is trained to attack ‘bright lines’ the way hounds attack 
foxes.  Acceptance by the courts of arguments that one thing is the ‘functional equivalent’ of the 
other, for example, soon breaks down what might have been a bright line into a blurry impres-
sionistic pattern.”), overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (adopting fact-
sensitive standard for reviewing searches of containers in vehicles subject to search). 
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are so unreasonable” as to violate the Fourth Amendment.159  The 
concern that jury factfinding might be corrupted by insufficient com-
munity support for the protections the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
is, at least sometimes, counteracted by the stake that ordinary citizens 
clearly have in “strik[ing] a sensible balance between liberty and or-
der[:] If they unreasonably handcuff the cops, their community will 
suffer; and if they allow the cops to handcuff citizens unreasonably, 
they are likewise putting themselves at risk.”160  Finally, the prospect 
that jury decisionmaking might result in nonuniform verdicts, far from 
being decried as a vice, might be thought by some to be a virtue that 
perfects democratic rule by giving a persistent dissenting group “tem-
porally or spatially restricted power to express their views.”161 
We take no position on the merits of judicial factfinding animated 
by concerns for uniform application of constitutional principles.  We 
note only that had the Court decided Scott on this ground, as it easily 
could have, it would have avoided stigmatizing an identifiable sub-
community’s view of social reality as too “unreasonable” to be given 
consideration in the administration of justice.  No group of citizens’ 
views of the facts having been treated as privileged by the law, the 
members of subcommunities that had the minority view would have 
had no reason to see the law as less legitimately binding on them than 
the members of the majority, who likewise are expected to assent to 
judicial determinations that reflect the special competence of courts as 
expositors of the Constitution.162 
The same would have been true had the Court in Scott squarely 
based reversal on a second basis: the institutional advantage that 
courts have in determining the systemic consequences of particular le-
gal rulings.  If the law is trying to figure out whether one man 
“slapped [another] . . . on the elbow” or “merely touched him,”163 “ju-
rors, from the mode of their selection, coming from the various classes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 159 Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View of the 4th Amendment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2001, at M1. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2005). 
 162 This is not to say that the minority — like the majority — will not be irritated by courts’ 
assertion of power.  Even today, the (large) minority of the population who disagree with Roe and 
Casey protest its rule that courts, rather than criminal juries, weigh the social consequences and 
contested facts involved in the law of abortion.  That protest, in turn, excites political action.  See 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 399 (2007) (arguing that dissensus is “frequently expressed in legislation, 
which offers countless opportunities for judicial critics to interpose practical obstacles to the reali-
zation of constitutional norms advanced by a challenged decision”).  Here we invoke only the 
conventional argument that when courts exercise their constitutional interpretive power in the 
manner conventionally assumed to be appropriate, their decisions are legitimate in the moral 
sense. 
 163 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968). 
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and occupations of society, and conversant with the practical affairs of 
life” have an advantage in determining all manner of historical fact 
over judges, “whose habits and course of life give [them] much less ex-
perience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts of life.”164  
But by the same token, precisely because of their distinctive “habits 
and course of life,” not to mention the special “mode of their selection,” 
judges are likely to gain certain insights into the workings of the prac-
tical affairs of legal institutions.  Whereas most citizens, for example, 
have only fleeting contact with law enforcement, judges have recurring 
occasion to observe police officers and prosecutors at work.  They are 
thus, arguably, much more cognizant than are individual jurors of how 
damages verdicts — even intermittent ones — might change law en-
forcement behavior.  Indeed, far from taking these more abstract and 
largely unobserved costs into effect, juries might be riveted by the 
vivid consequences of policing gone bad in individual cases, and thus 
overestimate the likelihood of such misfortunes generally.165  Even if 
one does not believe that these sorts of influences should disqualify  
ordinary citizens from central participation in the administration  
of justice generally, one might still conclude that they warrant con-
straining ordinary citizens’ role in deciding certain matters, which for 
that reason should be characterized as “matters of law” for courts to 
determine.166 
Elements of such reasoning do appear in the Court’s opinion in 
Scott.  Rejecting the claim that the police should have discontinued the 
chase as a less drastic alternative to deadly force, the Court stated, “[i]t 
is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every flee-
ing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he ac-
celerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few 
times, and runs a few red lights.”167  Because such perverse incentives 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 164 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 222 (1862). 
 165 This feature of jury decisionmaking reflects the unique vulnerability of juries to distorting 
influences such as vividness, representativeness bias, hindsight bias, and the like.  See, e.g., Doro-
thy K. Kagehiro, Ralph B. Taylor, William S. Laufer & Alan T. Harland, Hindsight Bias and 
Third-Party Consentors to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991) (ana-
lyzing effects of hindsight bias on lay perceptions of third-party consent to warrantless searches); 
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by 
Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 123 (1981) (analyzing cognitive biases affecting lay juror inter-
pretation of quantitative evidence); cf. Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Ju-
ries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659, 680–81 (2006) (arguing that issues on which Fourth 
Amendment excessive force claims turn should be allocated between judge and jury with such 
considerations in mind). 
 166 Cf. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (noting that in performing certain tasks 
structured to involve legal reasoning, judges appear to display relatively greater resistance to bi-
ases than lay persons). 
 167 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007). 
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could be generated by any jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a 
case involving a high-speed chase, the Court could have treated this 
reasoning as dispositive of the case as a matter of law wholly apart 
from whatever facts any “reasonable juror” might have seen in the 
tape. 
Again, we are not necessarily arguing that this would have been a 
persuasive basis for reversing.  Indeed, one could argue that judges are 
the ones who lack a realistic understanding of the costs and benefits of 
various policing techniques,168 particularly in communities whose 
members have considerable experience with the coercive incidences of 
them.169  Moreover, judges may be subject to capture by the authori-
ties they are supposed to regulate, especially in state systems, where 
electoral endorsement by the police and the district attorney tend to be 
necessary in judicial elections.  It is also a bit odd for members of the 
Supreme Court — who encounter the workings of criminal law en-
forcement from a remote, law-bookish perspective only — to think 
they have a better grasp of the consequences of Fourth Amendment 
rulings than do individual district court judges, whose dockets are 
likely to be dominated by criminal matters.  Nevertheless, as a ground 
for decision firmly established in familiar understandings of the insti-
tutional competence of courts in general, had the Court relied entirely 
on the bad consequences of permitting any jury to award damages in a 
high-speed police chase, it would have avoided gratuitously insulting 
any class of citizens in particular. 
Finally, the Court in Scott could have reversed on the ground that 
democratic political checks adequately assure the “reasonableness” of 
high-speed police chases.  Like many other bodies of constitutional 
doctrine,170 the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is highly 
sensitive to the generality of coercive state behavior.  In a case like 
Tennessee v. Garner — in which the police shot a criminal suspect who 
was fleeing them on foot — coercion is concentrated on a single indi-
vidual whose well-being is likely to be a matter of indifference (at 
best)171 to the general public.  Popularly accountable officials thus 
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 168 See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character 
of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137 n.114 (1999) 
(suggesting that “availability” heuristic distorts judicial perception of likelihood of accuracy of 
police investigatory judgments because courts see “primarily . . . criminal cases in which police 
intuition proved accurate”). 
 169 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (defending deference to inner-city communities’ balance of order 
and liberty struck by policing techniques that affect them). 
 170 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
 171 Although the Supreme Court famously avoided referring to this aspect of the case, the de-
fendant in Garner was an African-American youth, and the challenge to the state common law 
authorization of the use of deadly force against nondeadly fleeing felons was based primarily on 
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have little incentive to police the police in this context to assure the toll 
police behavior exacts on individual liberty is compensated for by its 
contribution to public order — the test for “reasonableness” under the 
Fourth Amendment.172  Accordingly, courts regulate the exercise of po-
lice power in this and like circumstances through strict enforcement of 
judicially defined reasonableness tests. 
Many other types of law enforcement authority, however, do im-
pose a burden on citizens generally, either directly or indirectly 
through their impact on parties whose interests citizens share.  Exam-
ples include sobriety173 and other types of vehicle checkpoints,174 
which burden ordinary citizens as drivers; random drug tests of high 
school students,175 which burden ordinary citizens as parents; and 
warrantless “administrative” searches of businesses,176 which burden 
ordinary citizens as consumers.  Precisely because the coercive effects 
of such exercises of law enforcement authority are meaningfully visited 
on the citizenry at large, their approval by politically accountable ac-
tors furnishes compelling evidence that these policies strike a reason-
able balance between liberty and order.177  Judicially enforced rules 
are thus not necessary in these settings to test whether such exercises 
of power are “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.178 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the racially disparate impact of this law enforcement technique.  See Tracey Maclin, Race and the 
Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 339–40 (1998).  
 172 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that “the standard of rea-
sonableness” under the Fourth Amendment turns on a “balanc[ing]” of the affected “individual’s 
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security” and the government’s interest in secur-
ing “public order”). 
 173 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 174 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (upholding checkpoints aimed at apprehending 
hit-and-run drivers). 
 175 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding drug 
testing program for students involved in extracurricular activities generally); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (upholding drug testing program for high school athletes). 
 176 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
 177 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 169, at 1173–74. 
 178 See, e.g., Lidster, 540 U.S. at 421, 426 (explaining no “rule is needed” to assure roadside 
checkpoints are “reasonable, [and] hence, constitutional” because “practical considerations — 
namely, limited police resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups” — can be ex-
pected to constrain the unwarranted use of this technique); Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (citing as evidence of reasonableness of drug-testing policy that a “democratic, participa-
tory process” in which parents were involved “revealed little, if any, objection”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 
665 (citing “unanimous approval” of parents at public meeting as evidence that drug testing does 
not unreasonably burden privacy of students).  
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This reasoning could well have been adopted in Scott.179  When 
police decide to initiate a high-speed chase — and to persist in it until 
they manage to force the suspect to lose control of his vehicle and 
crash — they create immense risk for members of the public generally.  
Indeed, innocent bystanders are often injured when struck either by a 
fleeing motorist or police pursuers.180  Accordingly, even if she is indif-
ferent (or hostile) to the interests of the fleeing suspect, the ordinary 
citizen as driver or pedestrian clearly has a stake in the police not re-
sorting to this potentially deadly seizure technique unless doing so gen-
erates commensurate benefits for public order.  Because the ordinary 
citizen has such a stake, politically accountable officials have an incen-
tive to police their own police to make sure they don’t engage in high-
speed chases without good reason.  Indeed, hundreds of municipalities 
— responsive to the opinions of citizens like Bernie and Linda — have 
already adopted regulations that place severe restrictions on the use of 
high-speed chases and prohibit them from being used to apprehend 
drivers who resist being pulled over for minor traffic infractions.181 
Once more, we are not necessarily arguing that the Court should 
have identified the adequacy of political checks as grounds for summa-
rily deciding Scott.  But had it done so, far from sending a message of 
exclusion to citizens like Bernie and Linda, it would have been convey-
ing in the most emphatic terms available to a court that the decision 
was to be made through a process — the enactment of law by democ-
ratically accountable representatives — in which the voices of all must 
theoretically be heard.182 
C.  Cognitive Illiberalism and Judicial Humility 
We have come not to bury Scott but rather to identify the lessons 
that can be gleaned from it.  We have argued that members of the 
Court majority were mistaken merely to “trust their own eyes” in 
viewing the Scott tape.  But the upshot can’t be that judges should 
never trust their own perceptions of the facts when determining 
whether to resolve cases summarily — instead sending every case, no 
matter how flimsy or outright specious the factual disputes are, to ju-
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 179 It was in fact a disposition urged on the Court by an amicus group consisting of various 
municipal and state governments and officials.  See Brief of the National Ass’n of Counties et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–17, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-
1631), 2006 WL 3693465.  This group was represented by one of the authors (Kahan) in his capac-
ity as an instructor in the Yale Law School Supreme Court Clinic. 
 180 See id. at 12 & n.9. 
 181 See id. at 15. 
 182 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999) [hereinafter 
WALDRON, DIGNITY] (developing theory of how legislation recognizes dignity of the minority at 
the same time it recognizes authority of the majority); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DIS-
AGREEMENT 108–13 (1999) (same). 
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ries.  Scott, we’ve argued, presents certain special features that made it 
inappropriate for the Court to treat it as warranting summary decision 
even though the case would have presented a “genuine issue [of] mate-
rial fact”183 only for an admitted minority of citizens.  The task, then, 
is to try to figure out what sorts of cues judges can look for when they 
are trying to distinguish the relatively few cases that possess these fea-
tures from the vast run of cases, including ones that rely on video and 
like forms of demonstrative evidence, that are otherwise fit for sum-
mary adjudication.  Performing this task, we suggest, requires identify-
ing and taking effective steps to neutralize a set of interlocking social-
psychological dynamics that are likely to distort judicial decisionmak-
ing on factual issues that divide competing cultural and social groups. 
The foundation of such distortion is naïve realism.184  Social psy-
chologists use this term to refer to an asymmetry in the ability of most 
people to identify the effects of value-motivated cognition.  We are 
good at detecting when those who disagree with us about matters of 
fact are influenced by the congeniality of their beliefs to their defining 
group commitments.185  That’s the realism part.  The naïve part is 
that we are correspondingly poor at identifying how the motivation to 
form beliefs congenial to our own group commitments operates in 
us.186 
In the realm of legal and political life, this tendency has pernicious 
consequences.  Many important policies turn on issues of disputed fact, 
or predictions based on fact: Does the death penalty deter murder?  
Does global warming exist, is it caused by humans, and does it pose 
significant economic and environmental threats?  Does the minimum 
wage make working-class people better off or worse off?  Will vacci-
nating school-age girls against HPV cause them to engage in promis-
cuous, unprotected sex and thus increase the incidence of teen preg-
nancy and HIV infection?  Because they are not generally aware of 
their own disposition to form factual beliefs that cohere with their cul-
tural commitments, legislators, policy analysts, and ordinary citizens 
manifest little uncertainty about their answers to these questions.  But 
much worse, because they can see full well the influence that cultural 
predispositions have on those who disagree with them, participants in 
policy debates often adopt a dismissive and even contemptuous pos-
ture toward their opponents’ beliefs.  This attitude in turn provokes 
resentment on the part of their opponents, who, as a result of naïve re-
alism, bridle at the suggestion that they are conforming their factual 
beliefs to their values yet see exactly that sort of process going on in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 184 See Robinson, Keltner, Ward & Ross, supra note 18, at 404–05. 
 185 Id. at 405. 
 186 Id.  
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the minds of their (annoyingly smug, it seems) antagonists.  They natu-
rally proclaim as much — initiating an escalating cycle of recrimina-
tion and distrust.187 
The result is a state of cognitive illiberalism.  The vast majority of 
citizens in our society do not desire to impose their values on others.  
They accept the basic liberal premise that law and policy should be 
confined to attainment of secular goods — security, health, prosperity 
— that are fully accessible to persons of all cultural outlooks.188  But 
because the factual beliefs they form about the sorts of behavior that 
threaten those goods are (subconsciously) motivated by their cultural 
appraisals of those activities, such citizens naturally divide into oppos-
ing cultural factions on the policies the law should pursue to achieve 
their common welfare.  Locked into a state of cyclical recrimination, 
moreover, members of these factions become perfectly (painfully) 
aware of this alignment between competing factual beliefs and oppos-
ing cultural identities.  In such a climate, challenges to group-
dominant beliefs become indistinguishable from indictments of the in-
tegrity and competence of the groups’ members.  Opposing groups find 
themselves engaged in relentless, symbolic status competition — not 
over whose partisan view of the good the law will endorse, but over 
whose culturally partisan view of the facts it will credit.189 
We argue that the decision in Scott reflects and reinforces these dy-
namics.  The Justices in the majority couldn’t literally have perceived 
that no one could see the facts on the tape differently from how they 
saw them.  The evidence that some citizens might was staring them, 
literally, in the face: Justice Stevens, who presumably indicated even in 
conference that he was not of the view that the case was fit for sum-
mary disposition.  Even apart from Justice Stevens’s interpretation of 
the tape, though, the case was replete with cues that a decision on the 
grounds the Court settled on would provoke at least some generalized 
societal dissent.  It involved a coercive, near-deadly encounter between 
police and a citizen, always a potentially divisive matter in our society; 
numerous public interest groups had filed briefs in support of the re-
spondent; coverage of the case in the media, too, suggested the decision 
would be controversial.  Consistent with naïve realism, the Court 
might well have concluded, hardly without reason, that any dissatis-
faction various social groups would have with reversal would reflect 
the motivating impact of these citizens’ group commitments on their 
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 187 See Kahan, supra note 19, at 130–42 (tracking this process in political debates concerning 
sodomy, drugs, guns, smoking, and nuclear energy and global warming). 
 188 See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CUL-
TURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2006) (canvassing evidence that the vast 
majority of the public cares more about material welfare issues than symbolic moral ones). 
 189 See generally Kahan, supra note 19. 
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perceptions of the facts as well as their interpretation of the relevant 
legal precedents.  But what likely did not occur to the Justices in the 
majority was the degree to which their own perceptions (not to men-
tion the perceptions of those who would agree with them upon watch-
ing the tape) would be just as bound up with cultural, ideological, and 
other commitments that disposed them to see the facts in a particular 
way.190 
The basis on which the Court justified its decision exhibits the ten-
dency of naïve realism toward culturally grounded recrimination and 
distrust.  By declaring, in particular, that “no reasonable juror” could 
have formed beliefs contrary to the Court’s own, the Court inevitably 
called into question the integrity, intelligence, and competence of iden-
tifiable subcommunities whose members in fact held those dissenting 
beliefs.  Those individuals, the Court should have foreseen, would in 
turn react with resentment and (not insupportable) suspicion that 
members of the Court majority (and any who agreed with them) were 
motivated by their values to declare their perceptions alone to be “rea-
sonable.”  As in other settings, then, in which the law picks sides in 
factual disputes that arise from culturally conflicting worldviews, the 
decision itself could well have been expected to deepen illiberal status 
competition.191 
We believe this sort of outcome is avoidable.  Judges can but 
needn’t inevitably compound the dynamics of cognitive illiberalism.  
Indeed, we believe they are uniquely equipped to help counteract those 
dynamics.  The remedy is a form of judicial humility. 
In a recent article, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that an appro-
priate posture of humility counsels courts to be sensitive to community 
outrage.192  Judges, he notes, are boundedly rational, just like the rest 
of us, and as a result are prone to err both about the legal correctness 
of their decisions and about the practical consequences of them.  One 
remedy, Sunstein argues, is a sensitivity to anticipated community out-
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 190 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (observing that when judges 
are confronted with ambiguous facts that touch on charged issues they, like everyone else, “fall 
back on their intuitions” and display “[t]he kind of telescoped reasoning . . . called . . . ‘cultural 
cognition’”). 
 191 See generally Goldberg, supra note 150 (arguing that judicial factfinding responds to and 
reinforces cultural conflict); Kahan & Braman, supra note 94 (making this point about factual de-
terminations in controversial self-defense cases).  It is precisely because this aspect of Scott gener-
alizes that the decision furnishes a constructive target for criticism on this basis.  Our point is not 
that Scott, considered by itself, deprives the law generally of legitimacy; obviously, the degree to 
which any particular display of cultural partisanship undermines civic identification with the law 
will be negligible.  Our point is that the case displays a form of bias that is in fact pervasive in our 
legal and political system and that as a whole is responsible for illiberal conflict.  See generally 
Kahan, supra note 19. 
 192 See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
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rage conventionally thought to be antithetical to the judicial mind-
set.193  Humility — born of mindfulness of the limits of her own rea-
soning power — counsels the judge to treat the foreseeability of such 
outrage as a cue that maybe she is in fact wrong; it gives her, at a 
minimum, reason to rethink, and might, in some cases, furnish her a 
reason to decide a case in a manner contrary to her own inclina-
tions.194  Sunstein suggests that outrage normally serves as a corrective 
heuristic of this sort only when it is experienced by a large majority, 
unless the judge perceives that an outraged minority has some special 
expertise or might be specially situated to resist the decision in a way 
that has bad consequences for society overall. 
But our argument shows how humility might enlarge the circum-
stances in which judges should attend to the potential for minority 
outrage.  Judges, like the rest of us, lack full insight into how the 
mechanisms of value-motivated cognition shape their and others’ per-
ceptions of particular facts.  But just like the rest of us, they are per-
fectly capable of understanding that these dynamics exist and can  
adversely affect the quality of their decisionmaking.  One way to com-
pensate for the partiality, and the incipient partisanship, of their own 
factual perceptions is to attend to cues that a cultural subcommunity 
will react with outrage should judges privilege their own factual per-
ceptions.  For in that situation, the anticipated reaction will furnish 
judges with evidence that committing the law to a particular fact  
risks creating the delegitimizing forms of cultural conflict that we have 
described. 
More concretely, we recommend that a judge engage in a sort of 
mental double check when ruling on a motion that would result in 
summary adjudication.  Again, almost any time a judge does conclude 
that there is no genuine dispute about some set of material facts, she 
will be able to anticipate that some small percentage of actual jurors 
would nevertheless dispute them.  Before concluding, then, that no 
reasonable juror could find such facts, the judge should try to imagine 
who those potential jurors might be.  If, as will usually be true, she 
cannot identify them, or can conjure only the random faces of imagi-
nary statistical outliers, she should proceed to decide the case summa-
rily.  But if instead she can form a concrete picture of the dissenting 
jurors, and they are people who bear recognizable identity-defining 
characteristics — demographic, cultural, political, or otherwise — she 
should stop and think hard.  Due humility obliges her to consider 
whether privileging her own view of the facts risks conveying a deni-
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 193 See id. at 164.   
 194 See id. at 175–78. 
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grating and exclusionary message to members of such subcommunities.  
If it does, she should choose a different path. 
There is nothing radical in our suggestion that a judge temper her 
decisionmaking with a prudential sensibility of this sort.  On the con-
trary, that judges can and should exercise this form of discernment is 
the premise of Professor Alexander Bickel’s celebrated defense of the 
“passive virtues,” which counsels a rich array of avoidance techniques 
to steer the law clear of legitimacy-enervating gestures of partisan-
ship.195  All we are doing is calling attention to another legitimacy-
depleting gesture — the endorsement of culturally partisan views of 
facts — that courts should use this sensibility to avoid. 
But will judges inevitably succumb to the subconscious influence of 
their cultural predispositions even as they exercise the particular cor-
rective we have urged to avoid cognitively illiberal judicial factfind-
ing?  Maybe.196  Research is growing, however, on the power of the 
judicial role to impart habits of mind that counteract certain types of 
biases,197 including ones that distort moral reasoning.198  There is cer-
tainly no reason, then, to dismiss out of hand the possibility that the 
device we are recommending — that judges pause to consider whether 
what strikes them as an “obvious” matter of fact might in fact be 
viewed otherwise by a discrete and identifiable subcommunity199 — is 
one that would function as an effective debiasing strategy for cognitive 
illiberalism.  Indeed, the very gesture of attempting to do so in good 
faith would go a long way to counteracting the message of exclusion 
associated with a decision like Scott.200 
Connecting our proposal to Bickel’s prudential minimalism makes 
more concrete the limited scope of our caution about summary adjudi-
cation.  Courts are rarely impelled to adopt the self-abnegating style 
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 195 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (Vail-Ballor Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962); see also  
Sunstein, supra note 192, at 168–75 (grounding his defense of “humility” in the theory of passive 
virtues). 
 196 Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 32, 81–82 (2005) (“Reading Bickel’s [The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: 
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961)], one realizes that he had definite ideas about 
where the public policy of the United States should be moving and that these ideas were his 
‘principles.’”). 
 197 See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 166. 
 198 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, A 
Thumb on the Scale: Investigating Implicit Bias on the Bench, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forth-
coming Mar. 2009). 
 199 Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Indicate They May Uphold Voter ID Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1 (reporting Justice Roberts’s skepticism toward the claim that obtaining offi-
cial identification at the county seat as a prerequisite to voting is burdensome and reply of counsel 
that “[i]f you’re indigent, [the 17-mile bus trip from urban Gary to the county seat is] a significant 
burden” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 200 We are grateful to Judge Richard Posner for focusing our attention on this issue. 
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associated with the passive virtues.  As we have emphasized, the Court 
certainly could have foreseen, because of the contentious symbolism of 
the case, that its view of the facts in Scott would be disputed by per-
sons of a particular cultural outlook.  We can certainly think of other 
kinds of cases too — ones involving gun control,201 say, or environ-
mental regulation202 — that courts could readily anticipate would re-
sult in culturally polarized understandings of fact.  But those cases are 
far and away the exception and not the rule in ordinary litigation.  
Consequently, the prudential brake we are urging on summary adjudi-
cation is one courts should rarely feel constrained to apply in cases 
that otherwise seem fit for such disposition. 
It should also be clear that we are not advancing any sweeping in-
dictment of judicial consideration of visual or other demonstrative evi-
dence.  It is not unprecedented for the Supreme Court to attach photo-
graphs, maps, pictures, and exhibits to its opinions as support and to 
refer readers to them.203  In the aftermath, too, of Scott, judges might 
well feel emboldened to give more decisive weight to the factual infer-
ences they themselves are inclined to draw from videos or photographs 
in deciding summary judgment motions.204  There might well be com-
pelling grounds for objecting to these and like practices,205 but the par-
ticular criticism we are making of Scott doesn’t go to the propriety of 
what might be called a “sensory jurisprudence” generally. 
Our concern with the Court’s reliance on the Scott tape is much 
more focused.  At least within the terms of our argument, there is 
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 201 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman & John Gastil, A Cultural Critique of Gun Litigation, 
in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND 
MASS TORTS 105 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (arguing that use of litigation to regulate guns 
exacerbates cultural conflict). 
 202 Cf. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate 
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2007) (describing resort to tort cases in response 
to global warming). 
 203 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704, 1707 (1997) (stating that 
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 204 See, e.g., Green v. N.J. State Police, No. 06-4111, 2007 WL 2453580, at *2 n.1 (3d Cir. Aug. 
29, 2007) (using video evidence to establish facts but affirming denial of summary judgment); 
Sharp v. Fisher, No. 406CV020, 2007 WL 2177123 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 26, 2007) (granting summary 
judgment on the basis of the facts as depicted in a police video, and posting the video to the 
court’s website). 
 205 See Dellinger, supra note 203; Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1202043; Wasserman, supra note 53. 
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nothing problematic about a court deciding summarily based on its 
sensory impressions when the factual inference it is drawing isn’t one 
that is likely to divide potential jurors along cultural lines (in a per-
sonal injury case, say, where the object the plaintiff is seen to be trip-
ping on in a video is his own untied shoelace rather than a raised 
board in the floor of the defendant’s store).  In addition, where a fac-
tual inference would likely provoke cultural dissensus, our argument 
would counsel the judge not to draw it even if the basis for the infer-
ence is nothing other than her mere sensory impression. 
What should a judge do in cases in which she does perceive  
that summary adjudication would create the sort of cultural divisions 
we are describing?  As we have suggested, there are a number of  
possibilities. 
One of them, of course, is to permit the case to be decided by the 
jury notwithstanding the judge’s justifiable belief that a large majority 
of jurors would see the facts as she does.  Even if doing so did not re-
sult in a verdict in line with the factual views of the minority groups’ 
members, mandating that the case be decided in a manner that assures 
their perspective is given a respectful hearing makes it possible for 
them to assent to the outcome as one consistent with recognition of 
their status and competence. 
Alternatively, the court can decide the case summarily on some an-
nounced basis that doesn’t stigmatize the potentially aggrieved sub-
community’s view of reality as flawed.  The Court could have done 
that in Scott, we pointed out, by emphasizing either the need for ver-
dict uniformity in this area, the adverse policy consequences that 
would attend a verdict for the plaintiff, or the appropriateness of po-
litical rather than judicial regulation of high-speed police pursuits. 
That is, appropriate humility does not forbid judges to select an 
outcome that is likely to be more congenial to one cultural style or an-
other, but only to justify that outcome in terms that avoid cultural par-
tisanship.  Had Scott been decided on one of these alternative grounds, 
the outcome would likely not have been any less contentious in the 
eyes of persons who subscribe to what we have characterized as the 
bet cultural style.  But it would have been less demeaning to them. 
The law explicitly takes sides all the time on issues that pit conflict-
ing cultural values against one another.  In the ordinary tort case, for 
example, communitarians might object to using a cost-benefit calculus 
to determine the scope of the duty to use care.206  In an action for 
breach of contract, individualists might believe that contracting parties 
should be bound to all promises, including those that courts routinely 
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dismiss as “puffery.”207  In antitrust cases, the dominant consumer-
welfare philosophy will likely be much less congenial to egalitarians, 
who favor a more redistributional approach, and hierarchs, who might 
prefer a more corporatist one, than to individualists.208 
But when judges enforce the law in a manner that forbids dissent-
ing jurors to override the values reflected in such doctrines, they do so 
within a decisionmaking environment that (normally, at least) evinces 
respect for losers.  The ability of defeated parties to identify with such 
decisions, notwithstanding their disagreement with them, is preserved, 
in part, through the law’s genesis, and continued amenability to revi-
sion, in democratic politics.209  But just as important, the dignity of 
dissenters is protected by idioms of justification, including formalism, 
that disavow the law’s endorsement of a cultural orthodoxy.  Indeed, 
the array of techniques associated with judicial minimalism is ani-
mated by a recognition on the part of the judiciary that promoting lib-
eral pluralism in law requires judges to attend carefully to the lan-
guage they use to justify their decisions.210 
Far from promoting that end, proclaiming that there is only one 
“reasonable” view of the facts in a culturally contentious case need-
lessly burdens the law with partisanship, detracting from its legiti-
macy.  That is the simple, but important, lesson of Scott. 
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CONCLUSION 
To our knowledge, Scott v. Harris is the only case in which the Su-
preme Court has invoked brute sense impressions to justify its deci-
sion.211  Its remarkable invitation to members of the public to 
download the Scott video and decide for themselves what to make of 
Justice Stevens’s dissent reflects the premise that perceptions of “facts” 
don’t stand in need (or even admit) of the sort of reasoned defense we 
expect when courts make potentially contentious normative judg-
ments.  Our goal in this Article was to motivate a critical appraisal of 
the Court’s premise by determining empirically who would and 
wouldn’t agree with the majority after viewing the tape. 
Our empirical study found that when we “allow the videotape to 
speak for itself,”212 what it says depends on to whom it is speaking.  To 
be sure, a substantial majority of American society is inclined to see in 
Harris’s flight from the police the sort of lethal threat to public safety 
that in turn warrants a potentially deadly response on the part of the 
police.  But this view is not uniform across subcommunities.  Whites 
and African Americans, high-wage earners and low-wage earners, 
Northeasterners and Southerners and Westerners, liberals and conser-
vatives, Republicans and Democrats — all varied significantly in their 
perceptions of the risk that Harris posed, of the risk the police created 
by deciding to pursue him, and of the need to use deadly force against 
Harris in the interest of reducing public risk. 
These patterns suggest the influence of value-motivated cognition.  
Comprising several discrete mechanisms, value-motivated cognition 
refers to the tendency of people to resolve factual ambiguities in a 
manner that generates conclusions congenial to self-defining values. 
This conclusion was compellingly borne out by the relationship of 
cultural outlooks to views of the tape in Scott.  Individuals disposed to 
form extreme views of the facts in Scott tend to be united by adher-
ence to one of two competing sets of preferences about how society 
should be organized — one that is egalitarian and communitarian, and 
another that is hierarchical and individualistic.  We found that after 
viewing the Scott tape, individuals of the latter outlook formed views 
emphatically in line with those of the Court majority.  Those of the 
former outlook, in contrast, were more likely to see the police, not Har-
ris, as the source of the risk to the public and to conclude that use of 
deadly force was not a justifiable response given the risk that Harris 
posed.  This division brings the conclusions of our study into line with 
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those on cultural cognition generally, which show that competing cul-
tural outlooks of these varieties dispose people to disagree about the 
facts of all manner of putative dangers — from climate change to gun 
control to HPV vaccinations for school-age girls.213 
What should be made of these findings?  We have argued that they 
are the basis for strongly objecting to the Court’s reasoning in Scott.  
Our legal system conspicuously holds forth jury decisionmaking as a 
means of making the law responsive to, and hence legitimately binding 
on, individuals of diverse backgrounds.  The basis of the Court’s deci-
sion in Scott cannot be reconciled with this understanding.  It’s true 
that a majority of Americans would indeed see the facts the way the 
Court did after watching the Scott tape.  But the minority of persons 
in our society who would perceive the facts differently are not bare 
statistical outliers; they are a cohesive and recognizable subcommunity 
whose members share an identity based on common values and ex-
periences.  By asserting that the view of the facts these people came 
away with was one no “reasonable juror” could have formed, the Scott 
majority not only denied jurors of this identity a chance to persuade 
those of another identity to see things a different way.  It also assured 
that the law established by the case would be seen by members of that 
subcommunity as deriving from a process calculated to exclude their 
voices from even being heard. 
There were multiple avenues available to the Court for reversing in 
Scott, we have suggested.  But the justification it chose was the one 
that maximized the experience of exclusion for a recognizable segment 
of the American citizenry, needlessly infusing the decision with cultur-
ally partisan overtones that detracted from the law’s legitimacy. 
We do not mean, however, to attribute bad faith to the Court.  On 
the contrary, we have suggested that it’s likely that the Court in Scott 
unwittingly fell prey to cognitive illiberalism — and dragged the rest 
of us along with it.  Sincerely perceiving the facts to be unambiguous, 
the Court concluded, with considerable foundation, that only those in 
the grip of a partisan set of cultural commitments could see things oth-
erwise.  But in saying that, the Court necessarily made itself into a cul-
turally partisan decisionmaker in the eyes of those who saw, with just 
as much foundation, that the Court’s own view of the facts was cul-
turally motivated.  This is how honest disagreements of fact in our so-
ciety mutate into recriminatory sources of cultural conflict among per-
sons who in truth have no desire to enforce a moral orthodoxy through 
law. 
The incompatibility of liberal principles with the use of law to im-
pose a partisan vision of the good is well understood.  Our legal and 
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political practices are replete with devices that not only forbid full-
blooded sectarianism of this type but also effectively stifle even latent 
forms of it in their incipiency, lest rhetorical misadventure impel citi-
zens into illiberal conflict against their will.  In political life, these in-
clude the norm of public reason, which requires legislators and ordi-
nary citizens to justify policies on grounds accessible to persons of 
diverse moral and cultural persuasions instead of in terms that reflect 
a partisan conception of the good.214  In the legal arena, they include 
devices like formalism and minimalism, which enable judges to defend 
outcomes and elaborate the law without resort to more contentious 
moral claims.215 
What’s not nearly so well understood, however, is the threat that 
competing understandings of fact pose to a liberal society.  Indeed, 
forms of advocacy that feature seemingly neutral factual claims about 
how to promote societal welfare (“optimal deterrence,” “cost-benefit 
analysis,” “contingent valuation” and the like) are thought to be among 
the practices that dissipate illiberal conflict by avoiding reference to 
more contentious judgments of value.216  It might seem natural to see 
judicial idioms that focus on “facts” as conflict-avoiding for the same 
reason.217  But because we inevitably recur to our cultural values to 
evaluate empirical claims about what conditions threaten our welfare 
and what policies promote it, styles of argumentation that feature facts 
can polarize us every bit as much as one that deals with differences of 
value in a transparent way.218 
We have proposed a form of judicial humility as one technique for 
ameliorating such conflict.  But such a strategy, we concede, will on its 
own make only a modest contribution to this end.  Much more atten-
tion to solving the problem of cognitive illiberalism is needed, in both 
the legal and the political domains. 
Accepting the Court’s peculiar invitation in Scott hasn’t shown 
that every “reasonable” person would see the facts in that case the way 
the majority did.  But it has, we think, helped make it possible for 
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every reasonable citizen to see something much more important: that 
just as critical to liberalism as developing strategies for dissipating cul-
tural conflict over values is the development of strategies for dissipat-
ing cultural conflict over facts. 
